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In August 1949, an American military plane flying from Alaska to Japan collected 
an air sample that proved to be radioactive.  The significance of the discovery was clear: 
the Soviet Union had successfully exploded an atomic bomb.  While not a total surprise 
to American officials, the timing of the Soviet detonation caught many off guard; most in 
Washington had believed Russian scientists were years away from such a development.  
Taking a few days to organize his thoughts, President Harry S. Truman, on September 23 
relayed the distressing news to the country.  Possibly more so than it did government 
officials, the news stunned and frightened the American public.  The American people 
likely understood that with the Soviets possessing an atomic bomb, a new phase of the 
Cold War had begun, in which atomic superiority and relative security could no longer be 
presumed.  Making matters worse, in October Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese 
Communists (CCP), declared victory in his nation’s civil war, bringing a populous 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) onto the already precarious international stage.  As 
they had with the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, Washington officials long 
expected a Communist victory in China; but also like the former event, Mao’s rise to 
power further verified the communist threat and further reinforced the need for an 
immediate and decisive response.
In April 1950, the heightened tension led Truman to approve NSC-68, a National 
Security memorandum suggesting a new approach to American Cold War strategy.  
Though based roughly on the idea of containment – the general foreign policy that had 
prevailed since the end of World War II – NSC-68 advocated a much more aggressive 
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and combative approach than the father of containment, George Kennan, had likely 
intended.1  Arguing that the Soviets, driven primarily by communist ideology, were set 
on world domination, NSC-68 concluded that only American military strength could 
check the Russian juggernaut.  Part of this military muscle, the memorandum stated, 
would take the form of a new, “super” hydrogen bomb.  Expressing no attempt either to 
quell the burgeoning arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union or to 
slow the rush toward Soviet-American conflict, NSC-68 portended a further polarized, 
bellicose, and frightening future.
One did not have to wait long, moreover, for such a future to arrive.  On June 25, 
1950, North Korean communist forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea, 
sparking what would be a three-year, bloody, Cold War battle.  Understanding the threat 
that the North Koreans (possibly with Soviet or Chinese support) posed, Truman 
immediately committed American troops to action.  While the goal of the war had 
originally been to restore the status quo, in September Truman made the crucial decision 
to move beyond containment, sending American troops north of the thirty-eighth parallel 
with the intention of restoring all of Korea under an anticommunist, pro-American 
regime.  The decision had disastrous results as Chinese forces, with the hesitant consent 
of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, entered the war in October, increasing the war’s 
fatalities and significance in the process.  
China’s intervention in the Korean War, combined with the general policy of 
NSC-68, provoked a reformulation of American policy toward all of Asia.  From the end 
1 George Kennan had indeed resigned over NSC-68.  In his place, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson appointed Paul Nitze, a veteran hard-liner, to head the State Department’s 
Policy Planning Staff and oversee the writing of NSC-68.
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of World War II until the Communist victory in 1949 American officials, while certainly 
showing partiality toward the Chinese Nationalists (GMD), had shied away from 
preventing a Communist victory by any means necessary.  Most officials understood the 
inevitability of a Communist takeover and few in Washington liked or trusted GMD 
President Jiang Jieshi and his corrupt Nationalist regime.  With the Communists 
consolidating power in October – and no doubt with the Soviet atomic bomb in mind –
American inhibitions regarding a more aggressive policy suddenly disappeared.  
Reinvigorated, Truman officials poured more money and resources into the weak, 
illegitimate GMD government now entrenched on the island of Taiwan.  More 
dramatically, Washington began organizing covert missions over mainland China, often 
with the assistance of the GMD, designed to incite resistance or uprisings against the 
Communist regime.  While the extent of these missions was still small in 1949 and 1950, 
by the end of Truman’s administration and the beginning of Eisenhower’s, they had 
become a significant component of the American arsenal.  The new, aggressive approach, 
moreover, was not confined to China; Mao’s victory provoked American aid to 
vulnerable nations throughout Asia.  As Michael Schaller points out, American foreign 
policy in Asia became “a knee-jerk reaction” as Washington poured money and resources 
into any regime that found itself under threat of communist takeover.2
At home, the upsurge of Cold War turbulence divided the American people.  
Frightened by the rapid successes of foreign communism, conservatives demanded 
protection of American interests.  The China Lobby, which had made its presence felt 
since 1947, exploded to the scene in late 1949, following the CCP victory.  The coalition, 
2 Michael Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, Second Edition 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 144
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set on restoring the GMD to mainland China, pressed Congress for aggressive action and 
came down hard on anyone advocating a more moderate policy.  Further, Cold War fears 
frequently led conservatives to suspect government officials and American citizens of 
disloyalty or treason.  Alger Hiss and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg made headlines for 
their alleged involvement in the Soviet conspiracy, and a young congressman, Richard 
Nixon, earned national celebrity for his role in weeding out such individuals.  Like 
Nixon, the nation’s fear of communism catapulted Joseph McCarthy, a virtually unknown 
Republican senator, to national stardom.  Maintaining the simple, but unfounded, claim 
that American communists had contaminated the State Department and other 
governmental agencies, McCarthy likely did more than any other American to bring the 
conflict between communism and democracy onto American soil.  For two years, 
McCarthyism dominated domestic politics, polarizing Washington and intensifying the 
public’s fear of communism.  
Despite the Truman administration’s own significant crusade against the 
communist threat – at home and abroad – the prolonged stalemate in Korea and the 
vitriolic accusations that conservative Republicans were flinging proved too much for the 
Democrats to bear; the 1952 election ushered in Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower to the 
White House and Republican majorities in both houses of Congress.  The change in 
power did little to ease the rising tensions.  Even with the death of Stalin in 1953 and the 
Senate’s censure of McCarthy in late 1954, the Cold War remained a strong force in both 
international and domestic politics.  Both Eisenhower’s campaign promise to “go to 
Korea” and his administration’s agenda of K1C2 (Korea, corruption, communism) 
demonstrated the continuing importance of American strength and the survival of 
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democratic institutions.  Further, while President Eisenhower himself may have 
represented a moderate sect of the Republican Party, his appointment of the staunch 
anticommunist John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State eliminated any thought that he 
would usher in a passive approach to foreign policy that would avoid the moralistic, 
uncompromising, and aggressive form of anticommunism supported by so many 
contemporary American officials.  
It was in the midst of this chaotic and tense environment that, on November 23, 
1954, Washington officials received word from Beijing that the Chinese3 were holding 
two Americans prisoner after having convicted them of working for the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).  Assumed by family and friends to have been dead for some 
time, John Thomas Downey and Richard George Fecteau had been in China since 
November 29, 1952, after their plane had gone down in the third year of the Korean War 
and Chinese officials had captured the two men.  On November 23, after two years in a 
Chinese jail, a Chinese court had handed down life and twenty-year sentences to Downey 
and Fecteau, respectively.  American officials, led by Secretary of State Dulles, lashed 
out against the charges immediately, refuting them as “reprehensible” and “without 
foundation.”4  Dulles adamantly insisted that the men’s mission had been legitimate, their 
imprisonments unjust.  Conversely, Chinese officials pointed to concrete evidence to 
3 For the remainder of the paper, the terms “Chinese” and “China” will be used 
interchangeably with the terms “Chinese Communists” and “PRC,” respectively.  The 
terms “GMD” or “Chinese Nationalists” will be used when referring to Jiang Jieshi 
Taiwanese government.
4 Saltzman to American Embassy in London, 25 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2554, 
RG 59, North Korea Files, Box 2886; “United States Government Text Which the 
Government of the United Kingdom Was Requested to Transmit to the Chinese 
Communist Foreign Office, 26 November 1954,” RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, 
Box 2886.
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prove their case and demanded professions of guilt and apology from Washington.  For 
almost twenty years, American and Chinese officials failed to find a middle ground in 
regard to the prisoners, leaving Downey and Fecteau to remain in jail.  The international 
fiasco did not end until February 1973, at the height of Sino-American détente, when 
President Richard Nixon finally linked the two men to the CIA and the Chinese 
consequently released John Downey from prison.5
Knowing now, a half-century after the episode began, that Downey and Fecteau 
were indeed CIA agents, it is important to examine whether such information was known 
by top U.S. State Department officials in 1954, or even earlier.  If the employment of the 
two men were, in fact, known within the State Department the question remains why 
officials did not publicly disclose this information for two decades.  If United States 
officials, specifically Secretary of State Dulles, knew the true identity of Downey and 
Fecteau and opted not to concede that information to the Chinese, then it would appear 
that American policy had sacrificed the freedom of two American citizens both to 
promote an anticommunist Cold War agenda and to save face in light of an international 
blunder.
II
At least since 1973 the American public has known the true employment of 
Downey and Fecteau, and that the executive branch purposefully orchestrated a cover-up.  
Scholars who have discussed Downey and Fecteau, however, have not adequately dealt 
with this aspect of the case.  Generally, studies of the Downey and Fecteau affair divide 
5 The Chinese released Richard Fecteau in December 1971.
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into three categories.  The first of these groups focuses on the two men in the context of 
the development and deployment of covert operations in Asia during the Cold War.  In 
1983 William Leary published Perilous Missions, a superb work on Civil Air Transport 
(CAT) and its coordination with the CIA.6  Thirteen years later John Prados published 
Presidents’ Secret Wars and William Breuer published Shadow Warriors, two 
comprehensive studies on U.S.-supported covert activity throughout the Cold War.7  All 
three books do an excellent job of tracing the careers of Downey and Fecteau, providing 
detailed accounts of their training and their missions.  Though scholarly in research and 
content, and crucial to understanding the complexities of American espionage during the 
Cold War, the books do not tell a complete story of the two men.  Focusing exclusively 
on Downey and Fecteau’s flight, none of these works sufficiently discusses the role of the 
United States government in denying to the American public the truth about Downey and 
Fecteau’s employment.    
A second category of books concerns the policies of the United States and China 
during the Cold War, and the effect of those policies on the Downey-Fecteau affair.  
Unlike the books mentioned in the first category, these books attempt to give some 
insight into Washington’s deceitful and ineffective approach on the prisoner issue.  Few 
of these works, however, do so sufficiently.  Two classic studies, Richard Deacon’s The 
Chinese Secret Service8 and David Wise and Thomas Ross’s The Invisible Government9
6 William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations 
in Asia (University of Alabama Press, 1984).
7 John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From 
World War II Through the Persian Gulf (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996); William 
B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 1996). 
8 Richard Deacon, The Chinese Secret Service (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 
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are representative of this weak historiography.  For one thing, discussion of Downey and 
Fecteau rarely takes up more than a page or two in the entire book.  Such a limited 
discussion makes comprehensive analysis almost impossible.  For example, in discussing 
Downey and Fecteau, Deacon jumps from Dulles’s public outrage in 1954 to Downey’s 
release in 1973, leaving out the bulk of relevant and intriguing information.10
A more fundamental weakness in most of these books, moreover, is the writers’ 
decisions (avoidable or not) not to draw from governmental records in their research; 
historians dealing with this topic have relied almost exclusively on newspaper articles 
and secondary sources.  The result of this research is that these books actually reveal very 
little that was not already known to the public.  For instance, in The Chinese Secret 
Service Deacon probes into Dulles’s unwillingness to admit to the Chinese the true nature 
of Downey and Fecteau’s employment, lest the United States lose face on the 
international stage.11 Deacon’s discussion, while accurate and helpful in understanding 
the ensuing government cover-up, is based entirely on newspaper articles not 
governmental records.  Likewise, in The Invisible Government, written in the midst of the 
Downey-Fecteau affair, Wise and Ross “uncover” information that was readily available 
to the public.  Throughout the book, the authors discuss some of the case’s contradictions 
– such as various allegations from government officials and American students that 
Downey and Fecteau were indeed CIA agents.  These revelations, as critical as they were 
to debunking the American cover story, are based solely on secondary source material 
Inc., 1974).
9 David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random 
House, 1964).
10 This succinct discussion can be found in Deacon, Chinese Secret Service, 370-372.
11 See ibid., 371.
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and newspaper articles.12  Deacon, Wise, and Ross truly cannot be blamed for their 
limited research, since they wrote their books while much of the useful governmental 
material remained classified, and in the case of Wise and Ross before the Chinese had 
even released Downey and Fecteau.  Regardless, nearly all recent works on American 
policy on the prisoners draw from these earlier sources, and thus these deficiencies need 
to be remedied.      
The third category of books consists of personal accounts by Americans who 
found themselves in Chinese prison alongside Downey and Fecteau.  Wallace Brown and 
Steve Kiba, both members of an Air Force crew captured by the Chinese shortly after 
Downey and Fecteau, and imprisoned for a time with the men, wrote books chronicling 
their experiences.  Unfortunately, these books, clearly unique in their access to 
undocumented information, fail to tell sufficiently the story of Downey and Fecteau.  
Kiba’s The Flag,13 representative of this type of study, is a strident narrative, composed 
almost entirely of mundane and often offensive dialogue (supposedly verbatim), and no 
scholarly analysis.  Further, having no possible knowledge of the parallel events ensuing 
in Washington or Beijing, Kiba’s work lacks both context and significance, contributing 
only to the reader’s understanding of the inhospitable conditions of a Chinese prison cell. 
By far the best work to date on the Downey-Fecteau case – yet not wholly 
satisfying - is Ted Gup’s The Book of Honor.14  Unlike other historians writing on this 
topic, Gup attempts to combine both the military and political aspects of the Downey-
12 See Wise and Ross, Invisible Government, 108.
13 Steve E. Kiba, The Flag: My Story: Kidnapped in China (Bloomington, Indiana: 1st
Books Library, 2002).
14 Ted Gup, The Book of Honor: The Secret Lives and Deaths of CIA Operatives (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2001). 
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Fecteau case into a readable narrative.  While Gup chronicles the life stories of several 
CIA operatives, his detailed discussions of Downey and Fecteau comprise a major 
portion of the book.  Further, Gup investigates aspects of the case that most historians 
have simply ignored, including the visits to the PRC by the prisoners’ families, high-level 
meetings in Washington regarding the men, and post-release events related to the 
imprisonments.  In this respect, Gup tells a relatively comprehensive and insightful story, 
following the Downey-Fecteau case from its origins in the early 1950s to its intriguing 
finale in the early 1970s.
What ultimately makes Gup’s book unsatisfying is that he ignores the numerous, 
previously classified government documents that shed so much light on the Downey-
Fecteau case.  Writing in 2001, moreover, Gup potentially had access to this material.  To 
his credit, Gup does frequently refer to NSC and CIA memoranda (which surprisingly 
and unfortunately, lack citation) but these documents do not address the crucial issue of 
the State Department cover-up.  For this reason, Gup’s discussion of government policy 
as it applied to Downey and Fecteau, while more elucidating than most historians’ 
contributions to the topic, fails to tell the entire story.
The story of Downey and Fecteau is one that needs to be told in full.  Not only 
does this require historians to focus on both the military and political aspects of the case 
and draw from relevant primary material, but also to tell the Downey-Fecteau story in the 
context of the Cold War.  The fluctuations in the Sino-American relationship between 
1952 and 1973 go far in explaining the turbulence of the Downey-Fecteau affair.  Thus, 
the story of Downey and Fecteau is, to a large extent, a story of China and the United 
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States in the post-World War II era, a seemingly obvious aspect of the narrative that most 
historians have not fully explored.
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Chapter 1:  A “Fantastic and Conflicted” Reality, 1954-1957
  The November 23, 1954 Beijing radio broadcast picked up by Washington 
officials announced that the Chinese were holding thirteen Americans accused and 
convicted of “espionage.”  The Chinese had sentenced the guilty Americans to prison 
terms ranging from four years to life.  United States Air Force Colonel John Knox Arnold 
and his crew accounted for eleven of these men.  American officials identified the 
remaining two men as twenty-four year old John T. Downey and twenty-seven year old 
Richard G. Fecteau.15
Following the broadcast, Washington and Beijing officials set to work arguing 
their cases to international and domestic audiences.  Though discussing the same series of 
events that involved the same individual Americans, the Chinese and American 
governments quickly realized they were developing two very different versions of the 
same story.  Not only did Washington and Beijing fail to find common ground in regard 
to the physical details of the prisoner cases, but also in the manner that the two nations 
hoped to resolve the affair.  In this latter regard, American government officials, knowing 
that at least some of the imprisoned men were guilty, set out to resolve the ordeal by both 
alienating the Chinese and intentionally burying the case in ambiguity and deceit.  On the 
other hand, the Chinese government – despite the existence of hard evidence to verify its 
case – proved, for a time, to be more lenient.  During the first few years of the prisoner 
15 John Foster Dulles to American Consul in Geneva, 23 November 1954, 
611.95A241/11-2354, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886; “13 Americans 
Get Terms Up to Life as Spies in Peiping,” New York Times, 24 November 1954, 1.
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affair Chinese officials were more willing to negotiate with Washington and they worked 
toward managing the prisoners’ releases through acts of compromise.
I
    Upon learning of the men’s imprisonments, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles lashed out against the Chinese for two reasons; first because he considered the 
imprisonments to be based on “trumped up charges,” and second because despite the fact 
that the men had been Chinese prisoners for nearly two years, the Chinese broadcast of 
November 23 was the “first word” on the issue heard by American officials.16  Surely, 
China’s delay in relaying information to the United States regarding the imprisonments 
aggravated American officials.  President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed the Chinese 
had, in fact, deliberately timed the announcement to cripple America’s international 
standing.17  It was the “wrongful” detentions themselves, however, which truly fueled 
American animosity.  Responding to all the convictions, the U.S. government issued an 
official statement insisting that the Chinese were holding the Americans “without 
foundation” and demanding their releases.  Furthermore, due to the fallacious and mean-
spirited nature of the Chinese charges and the consequent imprisonments, Washington 
16 This second complaint was only in regard to Downey and Fecteau.  At a June meeting 
in Geneva Chinese officials had admitted holding the Arnold crew in prison, but they had 
not mentioned Downey and Fecteau at that time.
17 This refers to a statement of Eisenhower’s in which he questions whether the 
announcement was delayed to provoke the United States into action that would “divide” 
the U.S. from its allies of “free governments.”  “The President’s News Conference of 
December 2, 1954,” Public Papers of the President of the United States, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), 1075 
(hereinafter PPDDE, and year).
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demanded both “compensation” and the “punishment of the Chinese Communist officials 
responsible for the denial of the rights of” the prisoners.18
Throughout government circles, Americans widely accepted and reiterated such a 
passionate and hostile response to China’s actions.  Responding to the imprisonment of 
Captain Elmer Llewellyn, a member of Arnold’s crew, Montana senator Mike Mansfield 
chastised the Chinese for “their total disregard of all the elements of decency.”  He urged 
Dulles to “do everything in your power to see that this wrong…be righted.”19
Congressman Thomas Lane of Massachusetts, too, sent the Secretary a letter informing 
Dulles of his frustration.  Representing Lynn, Massachusetts, Fecteau’s hometown, Lane 
passionately argued for an aggressive response to China’s actions.  He saw “Force” as the 
only reasonable solution to the problem, and thus if the “Chinese Reds” did not release 
the thirteen Americans within “one week,” Lane suggested supporting Jiang Jieshi and 
the GMD in “counter-offensive actions against the Chinese mainland.”20  It is ironic that 
the solution Lane suggested for the release of the prisoners was strikingly similar to the 
charges of which Downey and Fecteau were initially accused and convicted.  Downey’s 
congressman, Thomas Dodd of Connecticut, exhibited a passion and demand for action 
comparable to Mansfield and Lane.  Like his fellow legislators, Dodd expressed his 
aggravation over “[t]his outrageous breach of international law and of the rules of human 
decency.”  While Dodd did not share Lane’s desire for uncompromising aggression, he 
18 Dulles to American Consul in Geneva, 23 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2354, RG 
59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886; Saltzman to American Embassy in London, 
25 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2554, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 
2886.
19 Senator Mike Mansfield to Dulles, 23 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2354, RG 59, 
North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
20 Congressman Thomas Lane to Dulles, 24 November 1954, 611.95A251/11-2454, RG 
59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2887.
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did advocate moving “beyond the line of diplomatic protest”; this, however, would take 
the form of trade embargoes or naval blockades, not attacks on mainland China.  Dodd 
did not want to “bring [the United States] into armed conflict” with the PRC.  The 
cautious congressman quickly qualified his weariness over aggression, however, by 
insisting that the PRC would “only respect strength.”21
Responding to Congressmen Lane and Dodd, Assistant Secretary of State 
Thruston Morton agreed with the men’s “indignation at the outrageous and illegal action 
of the Chinese Communists.”  Further, he promised the congressmen that the U.S. 
government would do everything possible to free the thirteen Americans.  Morton even 
questioned the effectiveness of Dodd’s proposal to tighten trade embargoes on China 
(and presumably other non-militant tactics), contending that they would never, “even if 
successful, provide the kind of immediate and compelling pressure needed to free the 
detained Americans.”22  Clearly the State Department was considering a more immediate, 
aggressive response to the prisoner issue.
The public calls for strong action echoing throughout Washington should have 
been expected in light of the malevolent nature of Sino-American relations throughout 
the 1950s.  The militant tone of the congressmen’s and Morton’s correspondence, 
however, produced a slightly misleading portrayal of actual State Department policy.  
Dulles did not want outright war with China.  The plethora of calls for revenge and 
punishment for the imprisonments existed only in public speeches and correspondence 
21 Congressman Thomas Dodd to Eisenhower, 30 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-3054, 
RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
22 Thruston Morton to Lane, 1 December 1954, 611.95A241/12-154, RG 59, North Korea 
Files 1950-1954, Box 2886; Morton to Dodd, 9 December 1954, 611.95A241/12-954, 
RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
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with concerned Americans, never in classified memoranda or private meetings.  The 
aggressive, jingoistic language of Washington’s response to the imprisonments should 
thus be understood more as a political tactic to sooth a frustrated and anxious public than 
as a direct call for military action.23  This did not mean that Dulles sought peace with 
China, only that he was not an extremist.  The Secretary of State was, nonetheless, an 
uncompromising anticommunist, and his uncooperative response to the Chinese 
broadcast – while not a call for war – assured that peaceful resolution was not in the near 
future.  This stubborn, politicized, and hostile approach to the prisoner issue remained a 
key component of American policy until the 1970s.  While U.S. presidents and 
secretaries of state never seriously considered going to war over the prisoners, they made 
certain – through public attacks, snubs, and ineffective policy – that Sino-American 
cooperation on the prisoner issue was not an option either.
II
Aside from this passionate – though hollow – rhetoric, State Department officials 
quickly got to work formulating an actual course of action on the prisoner issue.  The 
result, in the months following China’s broadcast, were two distinct policies regarding 
the two groups of American prisoners.  American officials agreed that all thirteen men 
had been on legitimate flights at the times of their capture and consequently, that the 
Chinese had acted criminally when they imprisoned all the Americans.  Aside from these 
23 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker makes a similar point in regard to American policy toward 
Taiwan in “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two Chinas Policy’,” in 
John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Immerman
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 240.
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significant similarities, however, Washington officials approached the two cases in 
different ways.  
In the case of Colonel Arnold and crew, American officials insisted that the 
eleven men belonged to the U.S. Air Force and that their mission had been a direct 
component of the United Nations-led fight in the Korean War.  As such, officials claimed 
that the men were traditional prisoners of war and should be released as stipulated in the 
Korean Armistice Agreement.  This approach promised not only the release of the 
prisoners, but also the chance to cast the Chinese as uncooperative or even criminal.  
Even if Washington’s strategy failed to secure the release of the men, such a policy 
ensured that the American public would view Beijing, not Washington, as the source of 
failure.
Supporting such a policy, Far East Air Force Headquarters reported that in the 
early evening of January 12, 1953, Arnold and crew, all members of the 581st Air Re-
Supply and Communications Wing of the U.S. Air Force, departed Yakota Air Force 
Base in Japan on “a routine leaflet-dropping mission over North Korea.”24  Designed to 
disseminate “psychological warfare materials,” Arnold’s mission appeared to American 
officials a “legitimate military operation” in wartime.25  Further, American officials 
24 Memorandum on “Air Force Prisoners of War in Communist Hands,” prepared by 
Millard Young for Charles A. Sullivan, 26 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2654, RG 
59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
25 Walter P. McConaughy to American Ambassador New Delhi, 31 December 1954, 
611.95A241/12-2854, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886; Henry Cabot 
Lodge to State Department, 20 December 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States 
1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 
1041-42 (hereinafter FRUS, year, and volume).
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pointed out that the crewmembers were in full Air Force uniform, and were carrying all 
the necessary identification and documentation associating them with the UN mission.26
Near midnight American radar had spotted the crew’s B-29 being “attacked by 
twelve enemy fighters.”27  Washington officials insisted the attack was not the result of 
the American plane straying over the North Korean-Chinese border, citing “radar 
evidence” that showed Arnold’s plane “12-15 miles south of the Yalu [River]” when the 
PRC fighter planes had “intercepted” it.28  Another official report corroborated such facts, 
placing the aircraft’s last location fifteen miles south of the Yalu River, near the North 
Korean city of Sonchon.29  The obvious purpose of the American reports was to prove 
that Arnold’s plane had not been flying over Chinese territory when Chinese forces shot 
it down – the argument PRC officials were presently employing.  If the American crew 
had been over Chinese airspace (a region in which American soldiers were not supposed 
to be fighting), using the Korean Armistice Agreement to secure the men’s releases 
would have proved more difficult.  Thus, with radar evidence and a firm defense intact, 
26 Anthony Nutting, Britain’s representative to the United Nations and a close ally to the 
United States throughout the prisoner affair, reinforced this fact to the United Nation’s 
General Assembly.  In his December 1954 speech Nutting rhetorically questioned why 
eleven American fliers would be dressed in uniform if they were carrying out a covert 
mission in China.  “Text of Speech Delivered to United Nations by Anthony Nutting,” 8 
December 1954, 611.95A241/12-854, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
27 Memorandum on “Air Force Prisoners of War in Communist Hands,” prepared by 
Young for Sullivan, 26 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2654, RG 59, North Korea Files 
1950-1954, Box 2886.
28 “13 Americans Get Terms Up to Life as Spies in Peiping,” New York Times, 24 
November 1954, 1, 6; Dulles to American Consul in Geneva, 23 November 1954, 
611.95A241/11-2354, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.  While American 
officials regularly used twelve to fifteen miles as the crew’s distance from the Yalu, flight 
navigator Elmer Llewellyn said they had been forty miles south of the North Korea-PRC 
border.  Kiba, The Flag, 269.
29 Memorandum on “Air Force Prisoners of War in Communist Hands,” prepared by 
Young for Sullivan, 26 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2654, RG 59, North Korea Files 
1950-1954, Box 2886.
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the American approach to the Arnold case appeared solid.  The location of the plane 
crash, the status of the men, and the purpose of the mission all seemed to support the 
men’s innocence – a conclusion that American officials gladly and boldly maintained. 
American officials never felt or acted as confidently in regard to Downey and 
Fecteau.  Consequently, American policy regarding these two prisoners was not as 
straightforward.  While American officials agreed that Downey and Fecteau were on a 
legitimate flight at the time of their capture, this marked the only significant similarity 
between American policies on the two groups of prisoners.  Immediately distinguishing 
them from Arnold’s crew, American officials insisted that Downey and Fecteau were 
“civilian…employees [of] the Department of the Army” who had been on a routine 
“flight [from] Korea to Japan”30 when they were “attacked.”31  Outside of this core 
argument – and the unwavering support for Downey and Fecteau’s innocence – American 
policy regarding the two men was immersed in confusion.  President Eisenhower 
succinctly described this ambiguity at a press conference soon after the Chinese 
broadcast, describing Downey and Fecteau’s status as “cloudy.”32
Two reasons lay behind this haziness.  First, American officials found themselves 
unable to prove convincingly their side of the Downey-Fecteau case due to the absence of 
concrete evidence such as radar reports.  This lack of evidence proved especially 
frustrating when American officials were forced to explain why Downey and Fecteau’s 
plane had crashed in China, a location over which they should not have been flying.  
30 Such a label first appeared in Dulles to American Consul in Geneva, 23 November 
1954, 611.95A241/11-2354, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
31 “United States Government Text Which the Government of the United Kingdom Was 
Requested to Transmit to the Chinese Communist Foreign Office, 26 November 1954,” 
RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
32 “The President’s News Conference,” 2 December 1954, PPDDE, 1954, 1083.
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Unable to point to radar reports to prove the “civilians’” location, American officials 
played dumb, claiming it was “unknown” how the plane got into Chinese hands.33
Further, due to the absence of information, preliminary reports from Washington and Far 
East Headquarters often contradicted each other in regard to the nature or the course of 
Downey and Fecteau’s flight.34
Second, American officials quickly discovered the difficulty of applying the 
Korean Armistice Agreement to Downey and Fecteau.  Unlike Arnold’s crew, Downey 
and Fecteau were allegedly civilians, not military men.  Such a status did not make using 
the Armistice Agreement to secure their releases wholly useless, but did make it less 
appropriate.  Without a firm defense intact, moreover, confused officials often placed 
Downey and Fecteau in discussions of traditional prisoners of war who the Chinese were 
legally obligated to return, but they also frequently refused to associate Downey and 
Fecteau with the Korean Armistice Agreement or the UN-led offensive, relying on other 
channels to secure the men’s returns.  The question of the usability of the Korean 
Armistice Agreement plagued the Downey-Fecteau case for its first year, contributing to 
Washington’s vague and ineffective policy on the two prisoners.
III
Helping set the stage for America’s ambiguous policy on Downey and Fecteau, 
Ruth Boss of Eugene, Oregon, wrote to Senator Wayne Morse in a desperate plea for 
more information on the two prisoners.  Confused by the November 23 Chinese 
33 Dulles to American Consul in Geneva, 23 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2354, RG 
59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
34 This contradiction can be seen clearly in “13 Americans Get Terms Up To Life as 
Spies in Peiping,” “Leaflet-Dropping Mission,” New York Times, 24 November 1954, 6. 
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broadcast, Boss was mainly concerned with the fate of her brother, whom she felt was 
somehow linked to the two “civilians” the Chinese were allegedly holding.  Though Boss 
herself learned very little from Washington, her inquiry helped expose not only the case’s 
ambiguity but also the contradictory and deceitful nature of early American policy.
Boss’s brother, Robert Snoddy, was a CAT pilot whose C-47 had supposedly 
“exploded in midair” in 1952.  According to reports available to Boss, Snoddy and co-
pilot Norman Schwartz had flown out of Seoul, South Korea on November 26, 1952 
heading for Miko, Japan.  Not only did the aircraft type, departure date35 and city, and 
destination provide comparisons to Downey and Fecteau’s doomed mission, but 
Snoddy’s last flight report listed “the names of J. Downey, civilian, and R. Fecteau, 
civilian.”36  From this, Boss assumed that her brother had been flying the two men at the 
time of the crash.  Aside from that, however, Boss was completely in the dark.
Boss’s confusion, reasonably enough, stemmed from the fact that while CAT 
officials had informed her, “all hands perished with [Snoddy’s] plane,” Chinese officials 
broadcasted they had Downey and Fecteau in their possession.  Moreover, in a United 
Press article that Boss included with her letter to Morse, a CAT spokesman alleged that 
the only people on board the missing C-47 were Snoddy and Schwartz.  If Snoddy’s 
flight report were accurate, and Downey and Fecteau had been aboard the plane, Downey 
and Fecteau should have been dead, not in a Chinese prison.  Conversely, if CAT’s 
allegation were true then there existed no satisfying explanation for Downey and 
35 It is not entirely clear why Boss’s letter refers to the date November 26 while the date 
of Downey and Fecteau’s crash was November 29.  It is possible that the C-47 was 
stationed in Korea for several days before departing.
36 Ruth Boss to Wayne Morse, 25 November 1954, 611.95A241/12-354, RG 59, North 
Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
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Fecteau’s names being on the pilots’ flight report.  Understandably, in her letter to Morse, 
Boss demanded to know who was lying.37
Aside from the discrepancy between CAT and the flight report, the UP article also 
highlighted a contradiction between the statements coming from Washington and Far 
East Command Headquarters in Japan.  According to Washington officials and Snoddy’s 
flight report, Downey and Fecteau were civilian employees of the Department of Army, 
flying from Korea to Japan.  However, soon after the doomed flight a spokesman from 
Far East Command Headquarters, where Downey and Fecteau presumably would have 
been stationed, stated there was “no record of the men in the current or retired civilian 
employees file.”38  Not only were private citizens questioning the official American 
position, but it appears that in the first few days following the Chinese broadcast not all 
American officials had been sufficiently introduced to the government’s cover story.  
While the truth regarding Snoddy and Schwartz would not be made public for fifty 
years,39 Boss’s confusion offered a brief glimpse at the intricate government cover-up 
that was already underway.      
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.; Dolph Janes, “UP News Release,” 25 November 1954, included in Ruth Boss to 
Wayne Morse, 25 November 1954; 611.95A241/12-354, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-
1954, Box 2886.
39 It was not until 2002 that the U.S. Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office announced 
that Snoddy and Schwartz were indeed flying Downey and Fecteau on the night of their 
doomed mission.  That same year, in an effort to put an end to the confusion surrounding 
Snoddy and Schwartz’s role in the espionage mission, an American Army recovery team 
cleared a fifty square meter area in the foothills of the Changbai Mountains, where 
Downey and Fecteau’s plane had supposedly crashed.   Unfortunately, the team, while 
uncovering debris from a small aircraft, was unable to identify the wreckage and thus link 
it to the infamous C-47.  John Schauble, “Search for Spy Pilots Conjures Up Spooks of a 
Cold War Past,” Sydney Morning Herald, 27 July 2002, 15; Michael Dorgan, “Wreckage 
in China May be CIA Plane Lost in Korean War; Army is Looking for Pilots’ Bodies,” 
San Diego Union-Tribune, 30 July 2002, 7.
23
IV
CAT (later known as Air America) had, in fact, been in business since 1946, 
successfully carrying out paramilitary operations such as transporting military supplies, 
soldiers, and dignitaries throughout China.  It was not until spring 1949 – as the GMD 
was nearing its inevitable defeat in the Chinese civil war– that U.S. officials first 
recognized the benefit of using CAT as the airline of the CIA, and the start of the Korean 
War in summer 1950 only amplified this potential.  Pouring money into the financially 
weak airline, the CIA, by the end of 1949, owned CAT.   
With the Chinese civil war already a lost cause, American officials used the 
Korean War as the true testing ground for the new acquisition.  CAT fit well into 
America’s new military strategy – beginning under President Truman and blossoming 
with Eisenhower and Dulles – which placed a larger emphasis on covert operations.  In 
July 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had recommended to the Secretary of Defense 
that the CIA “be authorized to exploit guerilla potential on the Chinese Mainland to 
accomplish the objective of reducing the Chinese Communist capabilities to reinforce 
North Korean forces.”  Shortly thereafter, the State Department authorized the CIA to 
begin such activities.  This authorization, coming from the State Department, the 
Department of Defense, and the JCS, was “affirmed and reiterated” “[f]rom time to 
time…during the course of the Korean hostilities.”40  While this specific dialogue did not 
explicitly mention CAT, the covert airline was now part of the American arsenal and 
would be used most definitely in the pursuit of victory.
40 “Memorandum on JCS Requirements,” Attached to McConaughy to Robertson, 9 
December 1954, 611.95A251/12-954, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2887.
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In 1951, in line with these general orders, Snoddy and Schwartz, members of a 
select group of CAT pilots known for flying the most dangerous of missions, volunteered 
for a new CAT-CIA project known as TROPIC.  Commencing in spring 1952, TROPIC 
flights left Japan at night in unmarked C-47s and usually dropped cargo or people over 
Jilin Province in northeastern China for the purpose of stirring up resistance or 
establishing communication networks.41  In November 1952, however, Snoddy and 
Schwartz were to embark on a much more dangerous, and far less perfected mission of an 
in-flight pickup.  Traditionally, if CAT pilots needed to retrieve a Chinese agent, the 
American fliers would land their plane in China and proceed with the pickup.  The 
process was time consuming and agents increased their risk of capture.  A new procedure, 
however, allowed pilots to pick up agents without ever landing the plane.  To execute the 
new technique, the grounded agent would be harnessed to a strong wire, stretched tautly 
between two poles.  The airplane crew, flying at sixty miles per hour, would hook onto 
the wire, hopefully lifting up the agent in the process.   While practice runs had shown 
this type of retrieval to be feasible – though failure could mean decapitating the grounded 
agent – the November flight was to be the first real test.42
Accompanying Snoddy and Schwartz on November 29 would be two CIA agents 
– John Downey, who had often joined Snoddy and Schwartz on their previous flights 
over China, and Richard Fecteau, a relatively inexperienced intelligence officer.  Using 
the new technique, the four men planned to pick up Li Chun-ying, a Chinese agent who, 
since October, had been observing the action of a resistance team.43  The flight had, 
41 Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, 73.
42 Breuer, Shadow Warriors, 217.
43 Leary, Perilous Missions, 139-40.
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unfortunately, been doomed before the four Americans had even taken off.  Chinese 
forces had already captured the Chinese resistance team and the agents had consequently 
disclosed the plans of the Downey-Fecteau mission.  Three hours after the plane took off 
from Seoul Snoddy and Schwartz were dead from Chinese gunfire and Downey and 
Fecteau had been captured.44
V
Though few high-level American officials were aware of Ruth Boss’s specific 
inquiry, they all were very sensitive to the fact that the contradictory (and fallacious) 
statements currently circulating about Downey and Fecteau would make it difficult to 
formulate a coherent policy on the men.  Commenting on the grueling task ahead of him, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson noted that he could 
not conceive of any policy “that would not raise more problems than it would solve.”  
Concurring with Robertson’s dreary assessment, Dulles maintained that the only 
acceptable course of action was to “play everything down.”45  Ideally, such a policy 
would limit confusion, embarrassment, and conflict.  This indeed was the crux of a 
December 1954 State Department memorandum written by Walter McConaughy, 
Director of the State Department Office of Chinese Affairs.46  Provoked by the question 
44 Ibid., 138-40; Wendell L. Minnick, Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide 
Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action, 1946-1991  
(Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1992), 57.
45 Robertson-Dulles telephone conversation, 27 December 1954, 1:20 p.m., John Foster 
Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library 1951-1959, Telephone Conversation Series, Box 3, 
Folder 3. 
46 McConaughy sent the memorandum to Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs.  The memorandum was based on the discussions between 
Mr. McConaughy, Mr. Wisner, and Mr. Godel.  Memorandum on “Treatment of Cases of 
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of whether revealing a “fuller description” of Downey and Fecteau’s mission would assist 
American officials in their quest toward an effective course of action, the memorandum 
laid the foundation for a policy of evasion, ambiguity, and deceit that would remain intact 
for the next fifteen years.
The memorandum forwarded several reasons as to why it would be “highly 
questionable” for Washington officials to reveal more fully the nature of Downey and 
Fecteau’s flight.  First, it noted that the two men’s mission was “different” from that of 
Colonel Arnold’s crew.  The Chinese, who had given the Air Force men shorter prison 
terms, had apparently determined some type of distinction between the crews, and the 
Americans reinforced again and again that Arnold’s crewmembers were military men.  
Due to the real difference between the two crews, and the fact that Washington officials 
considered themselves in an “excellent position” on the Arnold case, the memo argued 
that any further revelation regarding Downey and Fecteau would be detrimental on the 
whole.  If anyone were to discover that the U.S. government had not been completely 
honest from start regarding Downey and Fecteau, Chinese, UN, and other foreign 
officials would naturally doubt Washington’s sincerity in regard to the eleven Air Force 
men whose imminent release appeared possible.47
Second, the memo intimated that initial “official” statements regarding Downey 
and Fecteau had not been entirely accurate, a revelation of which Ruth Boss was 
painfully aware.  A “fuller revelation,” therefore, would create further contradictions, 
“seriously weaken[ing] [America’s] stance.”  Even worse, the memo noted that such a 
Downey and Fecteau,” Walter P. McConaughy to Walter S. Robertson, 9 December 
1954, 611.95A251/12-954, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2887.
47 Ibid.
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revelation “might seem to put the Chinese Communists in a less unfavorable light.”  Full 
disclosure might actually allow PRC officials to “argue, with some plausibility” that 
Downey and Fecteau’s prison sentences were “lighter” than they could have been in such 
circumstances.48
Third, in accordance with the “long-established” custom “of all countries,” the 
memorandum insisted that the full nature of such operations should never be disclosed.  It 
can only be assumed that the “operations” to which the memorandum refers are covert 
espionage activities.  Calling for “official silence,” the memo suggested that Washington 
officials should not be compelled to reveal anything further regarding Downey and 
Fecteau since such matters were the concern only of the U.S. government.49
Finally, revealing fuller details should be avoided, the memo argued, because 
such disclosure “would be difficult” to defend domestically.  Officials worried that by 
acknowledging that Downey and Fecteau were CIA agents on an illegal flight over 
China, it would appear that they “were going out of [their] way to incriminate these men 
and seal their fate.”50  For the sake of the Eisenhower administration, therefore, U.S. 
officials should continue to deny culpability.  It is ironic that State Department officials 
believed releasing a “fuller description” would prolong the men’s imprisonments, when it 
would later prove to be their unwillingness to do so that guaranteed lengthier sentences. 
With the dangers of full disclosure and the inherent problems of the Downey-
Fecteau case clearly in mind, McConaughy laid out in the memorandum’s conclusion the 





American officials to assert that Downey and Fecteau had been involved in a 
“mission…directly connected with the UN effort,” without “going to the lengths of a full 
revelation,” but he understood that this would be difficult:  “Inevitably curiosity would be 
aroused in the UN as to the precise nature of their mission.”  Regardless of such 
difficulty, McConaughy suggested that American officials maintain that exact stance.  To 
deal with any awkward situations that might consequently arise, the memo suggested 
American officials “evade” the inevitable questions and stand firmly behind Downey, 
Fecteau, and Washington’s official position.51
As opposed to American policy regarding the Arnold crew – which required a full 
and detailed explanation of the mission in question – disclosure appeared to be 
detrimental to the success of American policy on Downey and Fecteau.  Such a policy, 
while effective in upholding a façade of American innocence and Chinese cruelty, did 
little to resolve the fundamental issues of the case or hasten the release of the two 
American prisoners.  Despite its ineffectiveness, American officials would, for the next 
fifteen years, remain faithful to its tenets of evasion and deceit.
VI
The Chinese versions of the Arnold and Downey-Fecteau cases obviously differed 
greatly from Washington’s positions.  Initial Chinese reports in late 1954 indicated that 
the Chinese had charged twenty-two men (thirteen Americans and nine Chinese) with 
espionage activities.  According to the Chinese, two of the Americans, John Downey and 
Richard Fecteau, had “stealthily crossed the Chinese border” in a C-47 aircraft before 
51 Ibid.
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Chinese forces shot down their plane on November 29, 1952.52  One and a half months 
later, the reports continued, Chinese forces shot down Colonel John Arnold’s plane in a 
similar fashion, leaving the Air Force men stranded in China’s Liaoning Province.53  The 
Chinese quickly charged the latter crew with the near identical crime of “having sneaked” 
into China in order “to conduct espionage activity.”  Further incriminating the Air Force 
men, the Chinese alleged that Arnold’s 581st U.S. Air Re-Supply and Communications 
Wing was one of several American “special air wings” that routinely cooperated with the 
CIA in carrying out “criminal activities against China and the Soviet Union.”54  While 
indisputably on different flights, the Chinese considered Downey and Fecteau, and the 
eleven Air Force men all to be American espionage agents. 
Aside from significant Chinese assumptions regarding the nature of the thirteen 
men’s employment and missions, substantial physical evidence “fully prove[d]” to the 
52 Charged along with Downey and Fecteau for espionage against China, the Chinese 
defendants Hsu Kwang-chih, Yu Kwan-chou, Wang Wei-fan, and Wang Chin-sheng, 
were sentenced to death; Chang Tsai-wen, Luan Heng-shan, Chung Tien-hsing, and Li 
Chun-ying, were sentenced to life in prison; and Niu Sung-lin was sentenced to fifteen 
years in prison.  “Judgment of Military Tribunal on US Spies in the Downey-Fecteau 
Espionage Case,” translated in People’s China, no. 24: 6-8, 16 December 1954, found in 
Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People’s China and International Law: A 
Documentary Study, Volume I (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1974), 625, 628. 
53 Following the Arnold crew’s imprisonment, the U.S. government determined three 
members of the original Air Force crew – Paul Van Voorhis, Henry Weese, and Alvin 
Hart – to be dead.  Crewmember Steve Kiba, however, insists that he saw Van Voorhis 
months after his imprisonment.  By Kiba’s own admission, however, he was the only one 
to see Van Voorhis; the official report on the missing prisoner is still that he was killed in 
action.  Contradictory reports on the fate of Van Voorhis can be seen in “Enclosure ‘C’” 
of memorandum on “Air Force Prisoners of War in Communist Hands,” prepared by 
Young for Sullivan, 26 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-2654, RG 59, North Korea Files 
1950-1954, Box 2886, and Steve Kiba, The Flag, 300.
54 “Full Text of the Judgment of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court of 
the People’s Republic of China on 11 U.S. Spies in the Arnold-Baumer Espionage Case,” 
3 December 1954, 611.95A241/12-354, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
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Chinese the guilt of the defendants.55  On board both planes, parts of which had been 
recovered after the respective crashes, PRC officials discovered substantial “evidence of 
espionage.”  From the salvaged sections of the two planes, on display in Beijing, Chinese 
officials had recovered “secret code books…sub-machine guns and revolvers, wireless 
receiving and transmitting sets for use on [the ground],” a “map of…Kirin [Jilin],” 
devices “for retrieving agent from [the] ground” and “implements for making fake 
passports.”56  To reduce any doubt within Washington of the authenticity of the evidence, 
British officials in Beijing had viewed the “exhibits” of the two planes’ wreckages, and 
they believed “little evidence of obvious faking” existed.57
Further convincing the Chinese officials of the men’s guilt were the alleged 
confessions of both Downey and Arnold to their involvement in espionage activities.  
According to Chinese officials, Downey had conceded that throughout 1951 and 1952 he 
was actively involved in training Chinese agents on the Saipan Islands, and dropping 
them into mainland China with the purpose of creating insurgent, guerilla warfare.  
Downey allegedly admitted that he had conducted three such drops in the four months 
preceding his 1952 capture.58  PRC officials claimed Arnold had confessed as well to his 
55 Ibid.
56 Summary of United Press of India report on prisoners, Kennedy to Dulles, 30 
December 1954, 611.95A241/12-3054, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886; 
Butterworth to Dulles, 17 December 1954, 611.95A241/12-1754, RG 59, North Korea 
Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
57 Summary of United Press of India report on prisoners, Kennedy to Dulles, 30 
December 1954, 611.95A241/12-3054, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886; 
Butterworth to Dulles, 17 December 1954, 611.95A241/12-1754, RG 59, North Korea 
Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
58 Upon his release, Downey admitted to newsmen that he gave the Chinese every bit of 
secret information he had, but it is not clear if this confession coincided with the one 
alleged by the Chinese.  “Downey Gave Chinese Secret Information,” United Press 
International, The Evening Star and Daily News, 14 March 1973, A-3.  Corroborating 
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engagement “in espionage work over China.”  In a “written deposition,” Arnold allegedly 
admitted that the unit to which he was attached had “introduced special agents and 
guerilla units into Communist-held areas and Communist countries.”59
While the Chinese did not obtain confessions from all the men involved, they took 
the confessions of Downey and Arnold, who the Chinese considered to be the “heads of 
two different espionage groups,”60 as representative of the remaining eleven men.61
Chinese officials also quickly pointed out that Downey and Arnold’s confessions verified 
the ongoing Chinese belief “that there had been a pattern of US espionage against China 
during the last seven years.”  By December 1954 PRC officials insisted that the Chinese 
had either captured or killed 230 American “special agents” after “American espionage 
organization[s]” had dropped the agents into China.62  Understanding that this number, 
despite the real possibility of exaggeration, did not include U.S. agents that proceeded 
undetected in China, the suspicion among Chinese officials in the Arnold and Downey-
Fecteau cases seemed to have legitimate basis.
Downey’s alleged 1952 confession were two Chinese agents, convicted along with 
Downey and Fecteau, who, in 1951 had joined the “Free China Movement,” a U.S. 
espionage organization.  According to Chang Tsai-wen and Luan Heng-shan, Downey 
had trained them for the specific espionage mission in question. “Judgment of Military 
Tribunal on US Spies in the Downey-Fecteau Espionage Case,” translated in People’s 
China, no. 24 (supp.): 6-8, 16 December 1954, found in Cohen and Chiu, People’s China 
and International Law, Volume I, 626-28.    
59 Summary of United Press of India report on prisoners, Kennedy to Dulles, 30 
December 1954, 611.95A241/12-3054, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
60 Ibid.
61 According to Fecteau in 1999, “there was no leader” between himself and Downey.  
The Chinese, however, decided that Downey was in charge since he had studied at Yale 
while Fecteau attended Boston University.  Fecteau quoted in Mac Daniel, “Former POW 
Finds Freedom by Making Peace With Past,” Boston Globe, 11 July 1999, 1.
62 Lodge to State Department, 20 December 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part I, 
1041-42; Kennedy to Dulles, 30 December 1954, 611.95A241 /12-3054, RG 59, North 
Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
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American action during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Chinese officials 
maintained, further incriminated Downey and Fecteau.  Beginning in April, several 
months before the Chinese announced the imprisonments of the two “civilians,” 
American and Chinese representatives met in Geneva primarily to discuss the terms of 
the Korean Armistice Agreement.  One component of this discussion was American and 
Chinese prisoners still being held by the opposing nation.  During the June 10 meeting, in 
an effort to resolve this sticky issue, American Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson gave 
Chinese Ambassador Wang Ping-nan a list of civilians and military personnel who 
American officials “had good reason to believe were imprisoned or…detained in 
Communist China.”  Johnson hoped the Chinese would return these individuals under the 
provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement.  Colonel Arnold and his crewmembers, 
along with dozens of other Americans were on the list.63  A problem emerged, however, 
in that Downey and Fecteau, both of whom had supposedly been missing from action 
since November 1952, were not listed.64  While this omission could have been due to the 
fact that American officials took Downey and Fecteau to be dead, the Chinese – who 
were currently holding the men in prison – took the absence of Downey and Fecteau’s 
names to signify Washington officials’ attempt to cover up or simply ignore American 
covert activity.  Conceding that the Chinese might have Downey and Fecteau in prison 
63 Soon after Johnson had given the list to the Chinese, Beijing officials admitted they 
were holding the eleven Air Force men.  Word on Downey and Fecteau, however, did not 
come until November.  “Background Information on United States Air Force Personnel 
Sentenced By Chinese Communists,” 3 December 1954, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-
1954, Box 2886.
64 Lodge to State Department, 13 January 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume II, China
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 26-30.
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would, according to Chinese logic, be one step closer to admitting that the U.S. 
government had authorized covert activities in China.65
The Chinese case was not without its flaws.  For one, some of the espionage tools 
on board Arnold’s plane were “regular” items carried by all Air Force crews, a fact that 
further reinforced Arnold’s traditional military status.66  Further, as American officials 
were quick to point out, the Chinese often forced confessions from prisoners, and thus the 
incriminating statements of Downey and Arnold were not wholly convincing.  These 
flaws were most significant in the Arnold case, in which the Air Force men appeared to 
be the victims of faulty Chinese assumptions and an unfair Chinese legal system.  In the 
Downey-Fecteau case, however, the strengths of the Chinese case outweighed any 
weaknesses; regardless of China’s questionable tactics, Downey and Fecteau were guilty 
of the espionage charges.  
Not entirely convinced of a distinction between the guilt of the two groups, 
Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai felt “his case against the fliers was good.”67  Commenting 
on China’s case, the Chinese press insisted, “beyond [a] doubt…the defendants were 
dropped into Chinese territory to conduct espionage activity” and “undermine the cause 
65 Interestingly, American officials took the same event as evidence of Chinese 
maliciousness.  In retrospect, many in Washington felt that Chinese officials’ silence 
regarding Downey and Fecteau at the June meeting proved the Communists’ desire to 
conceal the detentions from the American government and public.  Such an assertion can 
be found in Macomber to Dirksen, 14 March 1969, RG 59, POL 7-1 US-CHICOM 1967-
1969, Box 258.
66 McConaughy to American Ambassador New Delhi, 31 December 1954, 
611.95A241/12-2854, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
67 Lodge to Department of State, 20 December 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part I, 
1041-42.
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of people’s democracy in China.”68  Despite his confidence, Zhou soon made clear that 
he did not intend to prolong unnecessarily the Americans’ imprisonments.  If the United 
States and China could come to some understanding on the prisoner affair, Zhou insisted 
that the men would return home.  
VII
As the Americans quickly realized, this understanding would be difficult to 
achieve.  Unable to reach a settlement with the Chinese in the early days of the prisoner 
affair, Washington officials concluded that, with the drastic exceptions of military 
operations or total capitulation, they had run out of unilateral options.  Thus, to the credit 
of the Eisenhower administration, American Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), 
Henry Cabot Lodge quickly brought the prisoner issue into the UN.  The international 
body moved quickly and on December 10 the UN’s General Assembly (GA) passed a 
resolution granting Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold the authority to obtain the 
release of the “eleven” men “captured by Chinese forces…on 12 January 1953” as 
mandated by the Korean Armistice Agreement.  Stressing the legitimacy of the Armistice 
Agreement, the resolution condemned “the trial and convictions of prisoners of war 
illegally detained.”69
Though Arnold’s crew was likely innocent of the Chinese charges, the 
resolution’s wording was nearly identical to the ineffective American responses that had 
68 “Judgment of Military Tribunal on US Spies in the Downey-Fecteau Espionage Case,” 
translated in People’s China, no. 24 (supp.): 6-8, 6 December 1954, found in Cohen and 
Chiu, People’s China and International Law, Volume I, 627.
69 Text of UN resolution found in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, ed., Public 
Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, Volume II 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 417 (hereinafter PPDH, and volume).
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followed China’s November 1954 broadcast.  The harsh language worried Hammarskjold 
and following the adoption of the resolution he guided UN action in an unexpected 
direction.  Despite strong support for the resolution in both the UN and Washington, 
Hammarskjold aptly argued that its condemnatory and clearly politicized language would 
result in its ultimate failure.70  Based on the body’s vote on the resolution, 
Hammarskjold’s point had credence.  Support for the December 10 decision clearly 
divided along communist (as well as communist-sympathizing) and non-communist 
lines;71 its implementation would thus be an implicit sign to China of the UN’s favoritism 
toward anticommunism.  Hammarskjold feared that the Chinese government would take 
the resolution as an affront and would cool to any further negotiations.  To avoid this 
unfortunate fate, the Secretary-General made the controversial decision to deal with the 
prisoners by traveling to Beijing to meet directly with Foreign Minister Zhou.  Tossing 
out the mandate of the GA resolution, Hammarskjold made clear he was traveling to 
China under the authority exclusively of the UN Charter, which made him responsible for 
resolving any international conflict.  Such a neutral strategy, dubbed Hammarskjold’s 
“Peking formula,” would hopefully encourage Zhou, whose government the UN did not 
officially recognize, to speak and negotiate openly with the Secretary-General.72
70 The United States delegation had, in fact, wanted to use a more forceful tone in the 
resolution, but it was clear that such language would cost the U.S. support in the UN.  
Richard Miller, Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy (Oceana Publications, 1961), 
32.
71 The Soviet delegation opposed the resolution and the Indian and Yugoslavian 
delegations were among those abstaining.
72 Peter B. Heller, The United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961 (Lanham, 
Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2001), 41; Joseph P. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold:
Custodian of the Brushfire Peace (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1961), 61.
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The proposed meetings were not only controversial, they were also risky.  Since 
the UN had failed to resolve the Korean conflict before it had erupted into a full-scale 
war, the international body lacked the credibility that many had perceived at its inception 
in 1945.  A failed attempt at securing the American prisoners would thus bury the UN 
deeper in its own powerlessness.  Increasing that potential for failure, many diplomats 
feared that the Chinese Communists, in light of their exclusion from the international 
body, would immediately reject any motions by the UN.  
On the flip side, however, many argued that Hammarskjold had an obligation to 
free the prisoners.  Lodge contended that the UN could not continue to function if it 
failed to support the American men who had fought under its auspices.73 Furthermore, 
Hammarskjold’s mission provided the UN with the opportunity to project itself back on 
the international scene in dramatic fashion.  Optimistic officials even felt that since 
membership to the UN was of prime importance to the Chinese government, the Chinese 
would embrace Hammarskjold’s efforts.  The Chinese, the argument went, were more 
likely to welcome and respond favorably to Hammarskjold’s “Peking Formula” than they 
would to a condemnatory UN resolution.  Clearly, the end results of the Hammarskjold 
mission were not a given at the time of his departure nor were they a matter of trivial 
significance.   
In spite of Hammarskjold’s approach to the prisoner issue, once he had made the 
decision, the Secretary-General maintained Washington’s support for the duration of his 
mission.  This support, however, is surprising when one recognizes that Hammarskjold’s 
fundamental strategy in his Beijing Mission and the language of the GA resolution itself, 
73 Thomas J. Hamilton, “U.S. is Urging U.N. to Score Peiping,” New York Times, 3 
December 1954, 2.
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were somewhat contrary to the policy of American officials to that point.  Though he had 
discarded the inflammatory language of the resolution, Hammarskjold maintained its 
basic agenda: freeing the eleven Air Force men.74  This meant that Hammarskjold would 
not even attempt to free the American “civilians” – Downey and Fecteau.  Justifying his 
decision, Hammarskjold claimed it was the Air Force men who had, without a doubt, 
been involved in a UN-sponsored mission at the time of their capture, and thus they were 
the only individuals whose releases he felt obligated to secure.
It is surprising, therefore, how supportive American officials were of 
Hammarskjold’s coming mission.  In his 1955 State of the Union Address, Eisenhower 
made clear his commitment to “support and strengthen” the UN, citing Hammarskjold’s 
mission (taking place at the time of Eisenhower’s speech) as evidence of the international 
body’s importance.75  More specifically demonstrating an accord between 
Hammarskjold’s action and American policy, Lodge announced that the United States 
“had not asked for United Nations action concerning [the] two civilian employees of the 
Army [Downey and Fecteau].”76  And Dulles, in a direct contradiction to earlier 
statements, informed the press that Downey and Fecteau “had not been under United 
Nations Command and therefore, they were not within the compass of United Nations 
action.”77
74 PPDH, Volume II, 417.
75 “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 6 January 1955, PPDDE,
1955 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), 10.
76 Lodge had clarified this point early on at a meeting with representatives of sixteen 
nations shortly before he brought the prisoner issue to the UN.  Lodge to Dulles, 2 
December 1954, 611.95A241/12-254, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886; 
Hamilton, “U.S. is Urging U.N. to Score Peiping,” New York Times, 3 December 1954, 2; 
77 Dulles, Press Conference of 18 January 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, Speeches, 
Statements, Press Conferences, etc., Box 333.
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With their initial support of the GA resolution and by explicitly defending 
Hammarskjold’s Beijing agenda, American officials were backing away from their 
original insistence that all thirteen men had been on UN-sponsored, legitimate missions at 
the times of their capture.  While State Department officials had touched on such a 
distinction between the two flights in McConaughy’s State Department memorandum one 
month earlier, that same memorandum had concluded that the best course of action would 
be “to assert specifically that these men [Downey and Fecteau] come within the category 
of ‘UN personnel’.”78  While maintaining this stance would have proved difficult, 
American officials, initially, had appeared willing to try.  Thus, the statements of Dulles 
and Lodge represented a significant shift in American policy on the prisoner issue.  
Moreover, by intentionally closing the one channel that seemed to offer the most hope for 
the prisoners, the policy change reinforced the inherent ambiguity and weakness of 
American action on the two “civilians.” 
In response to Hammarskjold’s proposed mission, the Chinese surprised many 
observers as well when Zhou invited the Secretary-General to his country in the “interest 
of peace and relaxation of international tension.”79  On January 5, 1955, Hammarskjold 
arrived in China to commence his meetings with Zhou.  The meetings as a whole were 
amicable and the men made good impressions on one another.  Keeping to his proposed 
agenda, Hammarskjold focused all his attention on the eleven airmen in Arnold’s crew.  
In his attempt to secure their releases, Hammarskjold did not deviate much from the basic 
American position, insisting that the airmen’s mission had been part of the UN-led 
78 Memorandum on “Treatment of Cases of Downey and Fecteau” Walter P. 
McConaughy to Walter S. Robertson, 9 December 1954, 611.95A251/12-954, RG 59, 
North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2887.
79 “Cable from Chou-En Lai, Peking, December 17, 1954,” in PPDH, Volume II, 423.
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offensive in Korea.  Under the Korean Armistice Agreement, his argument continued, the 
Chinese should return the men to the United States.  In his effort to maintain an 
appearance of neutrality, however, Hammarskjold stressed that his conclusions were 
based on his own independent study, and implicitly not on the persuasive convictions of 
the U.S. government.80
According to Hammarskjold, who returned from the meetings optimistic, the talks 
produced two positive and significant results.  First, the Secretary-General accepted 
Zhou’s pledge that the Chinese policy of leniency was still intact and he firmly believed 
that the Chinese would release the airmen in the near future.  Second, Zhou complied 
with Hammarskjold’s request for substantive information on the condition of the 
prisoners.  To this end, Zhou produced films and photographs of the prisoners displaying
their good health, which Hammarskjold brought back to New York.81  More significantly, 
Zhou offered to allow the prisoners’ families (including the Downeys and Fecteaus) to 
visit China so they could “see for themselves how well [the prisoners] were treated,” a 
major concern of both the Eisenhower administration and many Americans.82
VIII
Before most Americans could even learn of Hammarskjold’s accomplishments, 
Secretary Dulles put an end to any hopes raised by the Secretary-General’s mission.  In 
late January 1955, in response to Zhou’s visa offer, Dulles decided that the United States 
“should deny passports to those relatives who may wish to visit American prisoners in 
80 PPDH, Volume II, 437.
81 Ibid., 439.
82 Lodge to State Department, 13 January 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume II, 26-30.
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Communist China.”  While he conceded that the decision “was not necessarily 
permanent,” the “tense” situation in China made it “imprudent” at that time to grant the 
relatives an exception to the general American travel policy.  Dulles feared that in a flurry 
of chaos and violence the relatives might “be grabbed and held as a second set of 
hostages.”83  Not only was Dulles concerned for the relatives’ physical safety, but he 
likely shared the common American fear of communist propaganda and brainwashing as 
well.  
Anticipating disappointment from Americans with personal ties to the prisoners, 
Dulles sent letters of “sympathy and concern” to the men’s families explaining that his 
decision was “in the best interest of our nation” and informing them that Hammarskjold 
was optimistic about the prisoners’ eventual releases.84  Further, Hammarskjold and 
Dulles distributed to the families the films and photographs of the American prisoners 
that showed the men “in reasonably good health.”85  Even with future reports, which 
would publicly corroborate this positive assessment, the prisoners’ relatives could hardly 
have been satisfied with their government’s decision.  
While Zhou’s invitation appears to have presented an opportunity to secure the 
releases of the prisoners – or at least ease the tension of the prisoner affair – one cannot 
83 Dulles made these statements during a meeting with other high-level State Department 
officials on 25 January 1955, 611.93241/1-2555, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 
Roll #10.
84 “Department Not Issuing Passports for Visits to Communist China,” text of letters from 
Dulles to families of U.S. fliers imprisoned in China, 27 January 1955, Department of 
State Bulletin, Volume XXXII, No. 815, p. 214.
85 Minutes of meeting on relatives’ visits to Communist China, 25 January 1955, 
611.93241/1-2555, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #10.  Some of the 
pictures showed the prisoners (the Arnold crew, Downey and Fecteau) playing volleyball 
and eating dinner.  From Steve Kiba’s website, <http://webpages.charter.net/kibasflag/>, 
“Propaganda Photos,” accessed 7 June 2004.
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blame Dulles alone for his decision.  First, Dulles’s decision was in line with 
Washington’s accepted policy on travel to the PRC; his decision, therefore, was 
somewhat automatic.  Second, there was no guarantee that allowing these relatives to 
visit the prisoners would have any real impact on the eventual releases of the Americans.  
To this point, Zhou had opted not to release any of the thirteen prisoners and past 
relations with the Chinese Communists had shown them to be hostile to American 
interests.  The degree of mistrust between the two nations was exceptionally great and 
thus revamping American travel policy in response to a Chinese proposal would have 
required an enormous, and possibly unrealistic amount of faith on the part of the 
Americans.  Despite these caveats, the explanation that Dulles gave for refusing to 
distribute passports seemed disingenuous.  In light of the unusual nature of the prisoner 
ordeal, Washington could have easily provided the families passports to China while still 
maintaining the general ban on such travel.  Granting such an exception would have 
allowed the United States to test China’s receptiveness to Sino-American cooperation 
without fully reversing America’s position on Asia during the Cold War.  If the Chinese 
proved to be sincere in their efforts to end the prisoner ordeal and the trips proceeded 
smoothly, the United States could have pursued such channels further.  If, on the other 
hand, the Chinese reneged on their invitations or exploited the families’ visits for political 
reasons, American officials would have a more solid foundation on which to execute an 
aggressive course of action on the prisoner issue.  Instead of proceeding in such a 
manner, however, Dulles was content to shut the door on any travel possibilities, 
immediately using Downey, Fecteau, and the other prisoners as “pawns” to show both 
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Chinese contemptibility and America’s resolve to defend its citizens from such 
maltreatment.  
Exposing further the rashness of Dulles’s decision, some individuals, including 
Hammarskjold, felt that allowing relatives to visit the prisoners might have a “good 
effect” that went beyond any personal relief the visits would provide for the families.  
Hammarskjold had been enthusiastic upon his return from China, confident that in 
Zhou’s invitations to the prisoners’ families, he had found a way to secure the men’s 
freedom.  Based on his own experience with political prisoners and with Beijing, 
Hammarskjold believed that Chinese officials were likely to respond more favorably to 
private appeals – made by relatives during their visits to China – than they would to 
demands from the U.S. government.86  Responding to such personal pleas would allow 
the Chinese to put an end to the prisoner issue without “losing face.”  Further, 
Hammarskjold believed that Zhou had “intended” the invitations “to be so regarded.”87  If 
Hammarskjold’s assessment were correct, then Dulles’s decision to deny passports to the 
prisoners’ families shut the door on the greatest opportunity to that point to secure the 
men’s releases.  
The Secretary-General’s candid comments on the possible benefit of American 
visitors to China were cause for alarm throughout Washington.  Though Dulles’s decision 
was merely one component of an accepted American travel policy, if the American public
86 Memo on “US Fliers Detained by Red China,” Lodge to Dulles, 2 February 1955, 
611.95A241/2- 255, RG 59, North Korea Files 1955- 1959, Box 2587.  Hammarskjold also 
voiced his feelings on the relatives’ visits in a telephone conversation with Ambassador 
Lodge.  Noted in Lodge-Dulles telephone conversation, 17 January 1955, 9:05 a.m., John 
Foster Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library 1951-1959, Telephone Conversation Series, 
Box 3, Folder 10.
87 Memo on “US Fliers Detained by Red China,” Lodge to Dulles, 2 February 1955, 
611.95A241/2- 255, RG 59, North Korea Files 1955-1959, Box 2587.
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believed that such a policy was now prolonging the imprisonments of Americans in 
China, the Eisenhower administration – regardless of its intentions – would suffer 
setbacks.  To prevent this potential predicament, Ambassador Lodge secured from 
Hammarskjold a pledge to “play the whole thing down,” in reference to Zhou’s visa offer 
and any “good effect” it could possibly produce.88  In addition to the Secretary-General’s 
promised reticence, Dulles hoped to “bury” the visa story in the American press.  The 
two major stories in early 1955 regarding the prisoners were the films and photographs of 
the men that Zhou had provided for Hammarskjold and Zhou’s visa offer.  Obviously, the 
former story was more politically attractive to Dulles, and he made sure Hammarskjold 
released it before Zhou did the visa offer, in order to “blanket” the potentially dangerous 
second story.89
IX
As demonstrated by the visa offer, Foreign Minister Zhou was approaching the 
prisoner affair in a very different manner than Secretary of State Dulles.  While neither 
side wanted war, the Chinese made clear that they did not want a prolonged international 
fiasco either.  Thus, as Secretary Dulles was busy “playing down” the prisoner issue in 
order to maintain American integrity, Zhou worked toward ending the affair in a speedy 
and moderate manner.    
Zhou’s leniency “impressed” Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold when the two 
met in January.  According to Hammarskjold, while Zhou felt his case was solid, the 
88 Lodge to the Department of State, 13 January 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume II, 29
89 Lodge-Dulles telephone conversation, 17 January 1955, 4:06 p.m., John Foster Dulles 
Papers, Eisenhower Library 1951-1959, Telephone Conversation Series, Box 3, Folder 
10.
44
Chinese government was willing to “back down” so long as American policy or rhetoric 
did not force Chinese officials to act otherwise.  Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 
often the liaison between American and Chinese officials in the 1950s, corroborated the 
Secretary-General’s assessment, insisting that the Chinese were prepared “to reduce or 
commute the sentences” of the American prisoners as long as officials in Washington did 
not “bluster” with the Chinese.  “If [the] US engaged in ‘bluster’,” however, or if 
Washington insisted on stepping up its support of Jiang Jieshi and the GMD, the Indians 
were sure the Chinese “w[ou]ld never release the fliers.”90  While the United States had a 
recent history of not fully trusting the Indian government regarding Chinese affairs,91
Hammarskjold verified to American officials Zhou’s ultimatum.  The “main grudge” of 
Zhou and the entire Chinese government, according to Hammarskjold, was “the 
[American] treaty with Chiang [Jiang].”  Hammarskjold intimated that while Zhou 
preferred “not…to make it too difficult to release the prisoners,” U.S. cooperation with 
the GMD would surely test his flexibility.92
Zhou’s desire for leniency appears sincere.  The Foreign Minister stressed that 
while he was confident the death penalty was “completely justified” in Downey and 
Fecteau’s cases (it should be recalled that the Chinese executed four of the Chinese 
defendants associated with the Americans’ mission), the two men would “come back 
90 Lodge to Department of State, 20 December 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, Part I, 
1041-42.
91 Washington officials had repeatedly ignored Indian warnings that the Chinese intended 
to intervene in the Korean War.  American officials felt that Prime Minister Nehru and 
the Indian government were far from neutral on the subject of Chinese intervention and 
tended toward being communist sympathizers.  U. Alexis Johnson with Jef Olivarius 
McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 
1984), 101.
92 Lodge to State Department, 13 January 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume II, 26-30.
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home one day.”93  In light of the fact that the Chinese had already handed Downey a life 
sentence, this concession on the part of Zhou was significant indeed.  The greatest sign of 
Chinese leniency and readiness to negotiate with Washington, moreover, came on August 
1, 1955, when the Chinese released Colonel John Arnold and his crew from prison.94
Zhou’s motive for releasing the Air Force men was not entirely humanitarian.  As 
Chinese Ambassador Wang Ping-nan acknowledged following the announcement, he 
hoped the crew’s release would “have favorable effects on the present [Sino-American 
Geneva] talks,” which began in early August.95  Regardless of this ulterior and political 
motive, it is significant that persuading American officials to discuss the status of Taiwan 
and Sino-American trade – the two main issues the Chinese hoped to resolve at Geneva –
occupied more importance to the Chinese than holding Americans in prison.  Such a 
priority, regardless of its political undertones, should be acknowledged.
X
Some were receptive to Zhou’s actions.  Aside from the understandable attention 
paid to stories of Chinese mistreatment of the prisoners – an apparent side effect of the 
Air Force crew’s release – the American press hailed the event as evidence of a 
developing, peaceful relationship between the United States and China.96  Likewise, the 
93 Ibid.; Lodge to Department of State, 20 December 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume 
XIV, Part I, 1041-42.
94 None of the Air Force men, whom the Chinese had sentenced to terms ranging from 
four to ten years, had served out his entire sentence when the Chinese announced their 
release.
95 Dispatch # 239, Johnson to Dulles, 1 August 1 1955, 611.93/8-155, RG 59, China Files 
1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2.
96 Butterworth to Dulles, 2 August 1955, 611.93/8-255, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, 
LM153 Roll #2.
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Indian press, traditionally more supportive of Beijing than of Washington, considered the 
release of utmost importance.  Not only did the Indians agree the release was a harbinger 
of future Sino-American détente, they also insisted that the release was so monumental a 
step that the American government needed to reciprocate with an act of equal import.  
Such a move would have to go “beyond present reciprocal action regarding return of 
Chinese students”;97 the Indians suggested granting China recognition, admitting China 
into the UN, or reducing American support of Jiang.98
Despite the upbeat response from both the American and Indian press, many 
Americans – including influential administration officials – refused to recognize the 
release of the Air Force men as a positive step.  Surprisingly, it was not the stories of 
mistreatment, torture, and brainwashing in Chinese prisons that contributed to this 
negative reaction.  In retrospect, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson pointed out “that such 
stories had to be expected.”  Dulles, too, recognized the public outrage over the stories as 
the “inevitabl[e]” result “whenever prisoners are returned” to their home country.99
Furthermore, Dulles – correctly recognizing that a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment 
following the Arnold crew’s release might “freeze up the Chinese Communists about 
letting the other [prisoners] out” – encouraged American officials to dilute any further 
such anti-China stories.  What concerned the Eisenhower administration more was the 
Chinese government’s apparent exploitation of the release.  Americans suspected the 
97 This is in reference to the hundreds of Chinese students who, during the Korean War, 
had been prevented from returning to the Chinese mainland.  After the war’s conclusion, 
however, the U.S. government lifted all restrictions and the Chinese students were free to 
travel.  Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 235.
98 From Hisdustan Standard, quoted in Cooper to Dulles, 3 August 3 1955, 611.93241/8-
355, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #10.
99 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 255; Dulles to Johnson, 16 August 1955, 611.93/8-
1655, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2.
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Chinese had set the men free only to make a case for their own magnanimity.  The 
concern certainly had merit.  For one, the Arnold crew, while not on an entirely 
benevolent mission at the time of their capture, appears to have been over North Korea 
when the Chinese had attacked them; the consequent imprisonment was thus in violation 
of the Korean Armistice Agreement.  By releasing the Air Force men, therefore, the 
Chinese were merely doing what they should have already done.  Further, Ambassador 
Wang readily acknowledged that there existed ulterior motives behind the release, 
namely the advancement of the proposed Sino-American Geneva talks.  Keenly aware of 
these aspects of the release, American officials resented this resort to propaganda lest the 
international public forget that the Chinese had illegally captured and detained the 
American prisoners in the first place.100  More fundamental than their concern over 
Chinese propaganda, many American officials felt the release of Arnold’s crew was 
simply not enough.  As long as the Chinese were still illegally holding Downey and 
Fecteau, among others, in prison, many could not bring themselves to view the release of 
eleven prisoners as being a truly significant or commendable action. 
While Dulles concurred with this negative assessment of the crew’s release for the 
most part, he welcomed it in one respect.  With the release of Arnold’s crew, Dulles 
believed he had found a way to free Downey and Fecteau.  By releasing the Air Force 
men, Dulles argued, the Chinese had undercut their case against the two “civilians.”  Up 
until the 1955 release, the Chinese had held all the prisoners on similar charges of 
espionage, but with the release of Arnold’s crew the Chinese appeared open to the 
possibility of releasing American “spies,” destroying “any basis for differential 
100 Dispatch #240, Johnson to Dulles, 1 August 1955, 611.93/8-155, RG 59, China Files 
1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2.
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treatment.”101  Downey and Fecteau’s continuing imprisonments, the argument 
continued, suddenly took on arbitrary and wholly unfair characters.  
Dulles’s strategy was certainly valid.  The charges against the Arnold crew were 
remarkably similar to those against Downey and Fecteau, and thus there was logic behind 
using the Arnold crew’s release as a key to free the two “civilians.”  But on the matter of 
freeing American prisoners – especially prisoners that Dulles knew to be guilty – such 
merit seemed beside the point.  The strategy was doomed to fail because it insisted on 
alienating the one government that would make the ultimate decision on the fate of the 
prisoners.  Instead of accepting the Air Force crew’s release as a beneficial gesture that 
pointed toward future détente, and using it as a springboard to negotiate the releases of 
Downey and Fecteau, Dulles saw it both as a way to rebuke further the Beijing 
government and to avoid any cooperation with the Chinese.
In addition to giving Dulles ammunition to attack further the “unjust” 
imprisonments, the Air Force crew’s release indirectly shed light on the true nature of 
Downey and Fecteau’s mission and the lengths that American officials would go to deny 
it.  During the numerous debriefings by CIA, U.S. Air Force, and State Department 
officials that commenced following the crew’s return to the U.S., the Air Force men 
openly discussed Downey and Fecteau and inquired into their status and fate.  Like many 
other Americans, the Air Force men were curious as to why the Chinese had released 
them but not the “civilians.”  Unfortunately, American officials – following closely the 
suggestions laid out in the 1954 McConaughy memorandum – denied the crew members 
the “fuller description” they requested.  Further, according to Steve Kiba, the radio 
101 Dulles to Johnson, 4 August 1955, 611.93/8-455, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, 
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operator in Arnold’s crew, U.S. officials told the Air Force men “to remain silent” in 
regard to Downey and Fecteau and “to forget…the whole touchy mess.”102
Coming nearly a year after China’s November broadcast, the intense desire for 
silence was certainly not an attempt to hide from the American public news of Downey 
and Fecteau’s presence in China.  Instead, the concern of American officials centered on 
the fact that Kiba, along with the others in Arnold’s crew, had come to know Downey 
and Fecteau during their time together in the Beijing Prison and had learned the truth 
regarding Downey and Fecteau’s employment.  Further worrying U.S. officials, Kiba was 
certain that all it would take to secure the men’s releases were official concessions of 
guilt and a public apology by the President.103  If Kiba spread such information 
throughout the country the credibility of the Eisenhower administration would likely 
suffer.  The stern warnings thus appear to be part of an attempt to hide from the public 
proof both of Downey and Fecteau’s guilt and the potential simplicity of their releases.    
XI
Immediately following the Arnold crew’s release, American and Chinese 
ambassadors made another attempt at diplomatic settlement, meeting in Geneva to 
discuss the remaining prisoners in China.  Previous diplomatic efforts by the UN –
already weakened by the apparent failure of Hammarskjold’s Beijing Mission – ended 
officially as these Geneva meetings commenced.  Secretary-General Hammarskjold did 
not object to this shift in jurisdiction; in fact, he felt it was not his place to “butt into” the 
prisoner issue if American and Chinese ambassadors would be discussing the same topic 
102 Kiba, The Flag, 273-274.
103 Kiba, The Flag, 278
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themselves.  In press conferences on the subject, Hammarskjold regularly commented 
that conducting multiple, simultaneous negotiations on the prisoners would be 
detrimental to the ultimate goal and thus he opted to step down his efforts toward 
securing the remaining prisoners’ releases.104  Hammarskjold’s “step down” was not 
entirely of his own choosing.  The Secretary-General, with the support of Washington, 
had always maintained that he was responsible only for the releases of UN personnel and 
thus with the Air Force men out of jail, the UN no longer had a reason to involve itself in 
the prisoner affair.  It was thus left to Chinese and American ambassadors, outside the 
auspices of the UN, to resolve the sticky issue of civilians still remaining abroad.
The Sino-American meetings at Geneva between Ambassadors Wang Ping-nan 
and U. Alexis Johnson stemmed from the Geneva Talks of 1954, which had dealt with 
the unresolved issues of the Korean War.  While Secretary Dulles initially did not want 
Johnson to discuss directly with the Chinese the issue of American prisoners in China, he 
finally acquiesced.  Dulles’s eventual compliance stemmed in small part from China’s 
decision to release Colonel Arnold’s crew – a result that Zhou and Wang had anticipated.  
More integral to Dulles’s decision, however, were his desires to quiet European criticism 
of American Chinese policy and to discourage any possible plans of Chinese aggression 
against the offshore islands.105
On August 1, 1955, after several months of preparatory work, the Geneva 
meetings commenced.  The agenda for the meetings (there was no agreement, or even 
expectation, on how long the talks would last) was twofold: (1) “The return of civilians of 
104 “From Transcript of Press Conference, UN Headquarters, New York,” 5 September 
1957, in PPDH, Volume III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 656. 
105 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet 
Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990), 156
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both sides to their respective countries”; and (2) “Other practical matters at issue between 
the two sides.”106  Such “practical matters” referred mainly to Sino-American trade and 
the ambiguous status of Taiwan.  Despite Wang and Johnson’s agreement on the agenda, 
it was clear from the start that the Americans placed more importance on the first item 
while the Chinese emphasized the latter.  American politics dictated both the importance 
of securing the prisoners’ releases and maintaining the status quo on Sino-American 
relations.  The Chinese, on the other hand, recognized that matters such as Taiwan and 
Sino-American trade were more vital to their interests than the return of Chinese 
nationals remaining in the United States.  This disagreement on priorities, while present 
from the start, did not greatly burden the talks for the first several weeks.  Other 
disagreements, however, emerged quickly and with disastrous results.
The first such disagreement erupted over who would be included under the 
“civilian” category established in the agenda’s first item.  Johnson was most interested in 
forty-one Americans who U.S. officials knew the Chinese were holding in prison.  Wang 
chose to focus on all Chinese nationals living in the United States – some 117,000 – who 
he alleged were not free to return to the Chinese mainland.  Understandably, this initial 
discussion produced discord between the ambassadors.  Wang insisted that while the 
Chinese nationals in the U.S. were not technically in prison, they were just as restricted 
from returning home as the imprisoned Americans were from leaving the PRC.  
Intimidation and suppression of information, Wang explained, resulted in the Chinese 
being “forced” to remain in America.  Johnson responded that since American officials 
placed no explicit travel restrictions on the Chinese nationals it was illogical and unfair to 
106 Dispatch #235, Johnson to Dulles, 1 August 1955, 611.93/8-155, RG 59, China Files 
1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2.
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place them and the American prisoners in the same category.107  Wang likely understood 
that Johnson would never agree to group the thousands of Chinese with the handful of 
American prisoners, and thus China’s action reinforced that a settlement on the prisoner 
issue would not come easily or quickly.
Despite, or possibly because of this initial harbinger of failure, Wang and Johnson 
set out, in mid-August, to formulate explicit declarations that the two countries would 
repatriate all of the other nation’s citizens within a specified timeframe.108  On September 
10, after much heated debate over the specific language of the declaration, Wang and 
Johnson released an “Agreed Announcement.”109  According to the declarations, the 
governments of the United States and China agreed that all citizens of the other nation 
“who desire to return” to their home country “are entitled to do so.”  Furthermore, the 
107 According to Johnson, American officials had, during the Korean War, restricted 
some Chinese nationals in America from returning to the PRC.  The policy was carried 
out on the grounds that certain individuals with technical training in nuclear energy, 
rocketry, and weapons design, would be a great asset to the PRC and thus a threat to UN 
forces.  The number of such individuals was small, however, and American officials 
never restricted them from traveling within the United States.  Johnson, Right Hand of 
Power, 235.
108 To prevent the ambassadors from signing one declaration together – a political faux 
pas during the Cold War – Johnson and Wang constructed two identical, but separate, 
declarations.
109 The main disagreement arose over the description of the speed at which American and 
Chinese nationals would be returned to their home country.  Ambassador Johnson hoped 
to use the word “promptly,” while Ambassador Wang preferred the phrase “as soon as 
possible.”  Johnson felt that the Chinese choice did not express enough rapidity while 
Wang felt the American choice connoted a demand.  Due to this disagreement the two 
ambassadors eventually settled on the term “expeditiously.”  Dispatch #616, Johnson to 
Dulles, 25 August 1955, 611.93/8-2555, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2.; 
Dispatch #624, Johnson to Dulles, 25 August 1955, 611.93/8-2555, RG 59, China Files 
1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2; Dispatch # 625, Johnson to Dulles, 25 August 1955, 
611.93/8-2555, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2.
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two countries arranged to “adopt appropriate measures so that they [the foreign nationals] 
can expeditiously exercise their right to return.”110
To some extent the Agreed Announcement was a monumental achievement.  The 
Announcement would mark what was to be the last formal agreement between the 
Chinese and Americans until the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972.  Furthermore, the 
Announcement seemed to bear fruit immediately as the Chinese, upon the conclusion of 
the September 10 meeting, announced the release of ten Americans from China.  The 
United States, too, quickly moved toward fulfillment of the Announcement’s stipulations.  
Since the Chinese nationals with whom Wang was primarily concerned were American 
residents, not prisoners, the question was not whether they could legally return to China, 
but whether American officials or American policy were obstructing their return in any 
way.  To assure the Chinese government that this was not the case, American officials 
advertised (in Chinese and English) the Agreed Announcement on radio, television, and 
in the 35,000 post offices throughout the country, informing Chinese residents who felt 
“imprisoned” to register their complaints with the State Department or the Indian 
Embassy.111  Possibly due to the widespread information campaign, over 200 Chinese 
returned to the mainland by the end of 1956; no Chinese, however, ever registered with 
State Department or Indian officials complaints of American interference.112
110 “Release: Re ‘Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China,’ Geneva,” 10 September 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, 
Speeches, Statements, Press Conferences, etc., Box 339.
111 Due to amicable relations between the PRC and India, the Chinese government 
selected the Indians to be their “third party” on the prisoner issue.  In China, the U.S. 
government relied on the British to oversee the progress on repatriation.
112 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 257; Memorandum on “American Prisoners in 
Communist China,” Dulles to all American Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 29 January 
1957, 611.93251/1-2957, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #10.
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This period of goodwill and compliance ushered in by the Sino-American 
agreement, however, was not to last.  From late September 1955 this apparent accord 
faded quickly.  Wang was not entirely placated by American action.  Despite his lack of 
evidence to support the charge, Wang insisted that Washington policy still restricted 
Chinese nationals from returning to the mainland.  More legitimately, Johnson and other 
American officials were frustrated that a week and a half after the ambassadors released 
the Announcement nineteen Americans (eighteen of them prisoners) still remained in 
China with no sign of imminent release.  
This lingering fact greatly “disturbed” Johnson, who had expected the word 
“expeditiously” to guarantee a more rapid delivery of the remaining Americans.113  Much 
to Johnson’s dismay, Wang now insisted that the Americans still remaining in the PRC 
had violated Chinese law and officials thus needed to review each of their cases 
individually before decisions on their releases could be made.  Frustrated, Johnson 
responded that Wang had not brought up this crucial exception during their earlier talks 
and that the Chinese government was reneging on the agreed terms of the September 10 
Announcement.  Wang, in turn, countered that by forcing the Chinese government to 
release the American prisoners, American officials were “interfer[ing] in [the] juridical 
processes and violat[ing]…[the] sovereignty [of] China.”114  From the start, Wang 
contended, the Agreed Announcement had obviously applied only to the “return of 
113 Dispatch #772, Johnson to Dulles, 23 September 1955, 611.93/9-2355, RG 59, China 
Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #2.
114 Ibid.
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civilians,” not the “return of persons who had committed crimes.”115  This exception, of 
course, meant that Downey and Fecteau, among others, would remain in Chinese prison.
With a stalemate forming in late 1955, the Sino-American talks dragged on with 
no visible results.  On September 20, around the time the Agreed Announcement began to 
splinter, Johnson grudgingly agreed to move on to the second item on the agenda – “other 
practical matters” – with the understanding that he could still refer back to, and demand 
implementation of, the first item.  As the talks went on, the Chinese released several more 
prisoners so that by the year’s end only thirteen Americans remained behind Chinese 
bars.  After December, however, the slow trickle of releases from China stopped 
completely.  The talks continued, but made little to no progress; in December 1957, after 
seventy-three sessions, the ambassadorial talks were finally suspended.116
The talks in Geneva reinforced just how difficult it was for the United States and 
China to trust one another and cooperate with each other.  Despite the fact that the Sino-
American talks were an example of diplomacy between the two nations they also served 
as evidence that the Sino-American conflict was not waning.  The fallout in Geneva also 
had repercussions for Washington’s approach on the prisoner affair.  Aside from the 
obvious fact that Geneva’s failure meant prolonged prison terms for the two men, 
following the September agreement Washington shifted its strategy on the Downey-
115 That Wang brought up this crucial exception should not have been a great surprise to 
Johnson.  While Johnson was correct in saying that the two ambassadors had not 
enumerated such an exception in the Agreed Announcement, Wang had brought up such 
a proposal during earlier talks.  Ibid.; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 245.
116 The two governments did not wholly abandon the idea of Sino-American talks as they 
were transferred in September 1958 to Warsaw, Poland, where American and Chinese 
ambassadors would meet until 1964.  Wang Ping-nan remained as China’s ambassador to 
the Warsaw talks, but Ambassador Jacob Beam replaced Johnson as America’s 
representative.
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Fecteau case.  Instead of demanding that Downey and Fecteau be released under the 
provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement – the policy that had loosely prevailed 
since November 1954 – American officials now insisted that the Chinese release Downey 
and Fecteau under the provisions of the September 10 Agreed Announcement.  This shift 
reinforced what had clearly begun at the time of Hammarskjold’s Beijing mission, when 
American officials had surprisingly backed away from their earlier association of 
Downey and Fecteau with the UN-led mission in Korea.  Moreover, the shift was logical 
in light of the ever-present ambiguity surrounding Downey and Fecteau’s status; it was 
not always clear (to the Chinese or Americans) if the Korean Armistice Agreement had 
ever applied to men who were not members of the U.S. military and were possibly spies.  
The Agreed Announcement, on the other hand, was more specific to the two American 
prisoners and it did not, at least according to American officials, contain exceptions for 
any of the civilian prisoners in China.  Therefore, even more so than pointing to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement, referring to the Agreed Announcement would directly 
place the blame for the men’s continuing imprisonments on the Chinese.
XII
With no resolution at Geneva, Foreign Minister Zhou appealed to Secretary of 
State Dulles’s senses in early 1957, when he proposed to Dulles a direct offer to release 
the prisoners.  In exchange for the U.S. government sending American newsmen to report 
on the social and economic progress of the PRC, Zhou would release Downey and 
Fecteau.  This specific exchange offer emerged in February 1957, but according to Dulles 
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the Chinese had forwarded a similar offer in 1955 in regard to the Arnold crew.117
Zhou’s earlier offer and Dulles’s rejection of it had gained little attention due to the Air 
Force crew’s subsequent release that summer, but Zhou’s 1957 offer, much to the chagrin 
of Dulles, maintained public prominence and attention.  After word got out that Zhou was 
again willing to swap prisoners for American correspondents, reporters routinely brought 
up the topic at press conferences.  Questioning Dulles’s “philosophy about the [travel] 
policy,” the reporters’ frustration seemed to center more on their own inability to visit 
China than the uncertain fate of the American prisoners.118  Selfishness aside, the 
reporters’ interest melded Zhou’s exchange proposal and the general American travel 
policy for correspondents together, guaranteeing more attention for the Chinese offer than 
it may normally have received.  Regardless of the publicity it gained, Dulles was no more 
willing to consider Zhou’s offer in 1957 than he had been in 1955.  
Either refusing to accept the offer as sincere or simply rejecting any offer 
forwarded by the Chinese, Dulles publicly snubbed the Chinese plan as “blackmail,” 
refusing to make American citizens “subject for that kind of barter.”119  Supporting 
Dulles’s decision in more moderate language, President Eisenhower informed reporters 
that the U.S. government could not go along with this “quid pro quo arrangement” until 
the Chinese “carried out their promises [likely referring to the September 10 Agreed 
117 Dulles refers to this offer in his press conference of 5 February 1957, John Foster 
Dulles Papers, Speeches, Statements, Press Conferences, etc, Box 353.
118 Examples of reporters’ questions on U.S. travel policy to China can be found in 
transcripts of the press conferences of February 5, March 5, and March 26, 1957.  
Department of State Bulletin, Volume XXXVI, Nos. 922, 926, 929. 
119 Press Conference of 5 February 1957, John Foster Dulles Papers, Speeches, 
Statements, Press Conferences, etc, Box 353.
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Announcement at Geneva].”120  Even if Dulles had accepted Zhou’s sincerity, he likely 
would have rejected such an offer due to its origins.  Dulles had insisted, and would 
continue to insist, that the Chinese were holding American prisoners in violation of 
international law, and even if it promised an end to the exhausting prisoner ordeal, he 
could not allow the Chinese to use “human beings for political purposes.”121  The irony –
whether or not Dulles perceived it as such – was that the United States, in rejecting 
Zhou’s offer, was doing exactly that.  In his response to the exchange offer, Dulles 
reinforced that his resentment toward the Chinese would take precedence over action 
beneficial to both the American prisoners and Sino-American relations.         
As was the case with Zhou’s visa offer, Dulles’s decision was in line with 
American policy.  American reporters were prohibited from traveling to the PRC and 
while a few determined newsmen made their way to China, the United States refused to 
condone such travel.  In tethering himself to existing American policy, however, Dulles 
missed an enormous opportunity, not only for the prisoner issue but also for Sino-
American relations in general.  The newsmen-prisoner exchange offer, along with Zhou’s 
invitations to the prisoners’ families in 1955, exemplified Beijing’s attempt to bring 
about a peaceful, quick end to the prisoner situation.  Further, these episodes appear to be 
part of a general trend of Chinese policy, between 1955 and 1957, which pursued 
improved Sino-American relations.  In the few years following the Korean War, 
Chairman Mao Zedong rightfully recognized the military and economic superiority of the 
120 “The President’s News Conference,” 6 February 1957, PPDDE, 1957 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), 130-31.
121 Dulles, Memorandum on “Americans Imprisoned or Detained in Communist China,” 
18 July 1955, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Papers (Ann Whitman Files), Dulles-
Herter Series, Box 4, Folder 6.
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United States; to avoid another conflict with the Americans, he opted to pursue a more 
moderate foreign policy.122  Dulles even appeared to be conscious of this development.  
At a press conference in July 1955, he conceded that there had recently been a reduction 
in the “warlike activities” and “belligerent Communist propaganda” that so defined 
earlier Chinese action.123  Regardless of Dulles’s consciousness of moderate Chinese 
policy, American action between 1955-1957 – while reflecting the lull in hostilities 
between the Americans and Soviets – showed American officials to be utterly opposed to 
Sino-American cooperation and set on toppling the new Chinese regime.124  Dulles, 
moreover, carried this general policy into the prisoner issue, as demonstrated by his blunt 
rejections of Zhou’s proposals.  Many years later in reference to Dulles’s rejection of the 
newsmen-prisoner exchange, but surely applicable to all his actions on the prisoner issue 
to that point, one New England newspaper pointedly noted that the Secretary of State had 
opted “to sacrifice the lives of two young men, whether they be innocent of the charges 
or patriotic Americans risking their all for their country.”125
XIII
In addition to learning of Dulles’s rejection of Zhou’s latest offer, the American 
people also gained more information, in 1957, about the true nature of Downey and 
Fecteau’s employment.  As this information came from private citizens, not Washington 
122 Chang, Friends and Enemies, 162; Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth 
Century, 149. 
123 “Statement by Secretary Dulles,” press conference of 26 July 1955, Department of 
State Bulletin, Volume XXXIII, No. 841, p. 220.
124 In United States and China in the Twentieth Century, 149, Schaller notes the “rigid 
stance” of the United States during these years, pointing specifically to American 
rejection of citizen and journalist exchanges with the Chinese.
125 “Mr. Downey’s Fate,” Bridgeport Post, 19 December 1971.
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officials, its dissemination only brought more confusion to an already uncertain case.  In 
early 1957, Charles Edmundson, a former aide to the United States Information Agency 
in Korea, announced during a television interview he was certain the Chinese 
Communists were correct in their accusations against Downey and Fecteau.  Secretary 
Dulles’s adamant rejection of Zhou’s newsmen-prisoner exchange offer further 
convinced Edmundson of the men’s guilt. The Secretary’s rejection, according to 
Edmundson, stemmed from his fear that American correspondents “might discover that 
some of the [prisoners] were United States intelligence agents.”  State Department 
officials had thus denied their travel in order to uphold better the “fantastic and 
conflicted” reality they were offering to the American public.126
While one could brush off Edmundson’s testimony as conjecture by an individual 
no longer involved in the American government, the report of several American students 
visiting Downey and Fecteau in September 1957 could not be ignored so easily.  The 
Chinese invited these ten students, who had just attended the Moscow Youth Festival in 
the Soviet capital, to visit the PRC and the American prisoners.  For much of their report, 
the students discussed the mundane details of Downey and Fecteau’s lives, describing 
their cells, their meals, and their recreation.  Commenting on their health, the students 
recalled that both men appeared physically and mentally fit.  Fecteau even boasted to the 
126 Associated Press, “2 Captives of China Called U.S. Agents,” New York Times, 25 
February 1957, 46; Charles Edmundson, “The Dulles Brothers in Diplomania,” The 
Nation, 9 November 1957, vol. 185, p. 315-318.
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students that he was receiving “better meals than Chinese fellow prisoners, including 
bread instead of rice.”127
The students’ comments on the prisoners’ health were good news to those 
concerned about the men, especially Downey and Fecteau’s families, who the U.S. 
government still prohibited from traveling to China.  But in a more controversial section 
of the report, the students surely shocked Americans when they reported that Richard 
Fecteau had admitted he worked for the CIA.  According to their report, Fecteau told the 
students he had first joined the merchant marine and then enrolled in Boston University, 
hoping to become a football coach.  It was his desire to earn a better salary, however, 
which eventually pushed him into the intelligence agency.128
Edmundson’s statements and the students’ report marked the first public 
American accounts that rejected outright Washington’s official story on the two 
prisoners.129  If informed men and eye witnesses believed that Downey and Fecteau were 
spies, many Americans began to wonder – as Ruth Boss had years earlier – who was 
lying.  Confusion aside, the public revelations did nothing to change American policy.  
The State Department and CIA made no comment on Edmundson’s statements and while 
national newspapers thoroughly covered the students’ visit, no one within the Eisenhower 
administration discussed it.  The only effect of the new information was to bewilder 
further many anxious and concerned Americans. 
127 Frederic Grab, “Visitors in Peiping Report 2 Americans in Prison Are Well,” New 
York Times, 8 September 1957, 12; Reuters, “U.S. Visitors Tell of 2 Held in China,” New 
York Times, 9 September 1957, 7.
128 Reuters, “U.S. Visitors Tell of 2 Held in China,” New York Times, 9 September 1957, 
7.
129 While Steve Kiba had assured American officials that the two men were agents of the 
CIA, his statements were never made public.
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XIV
In light of the perplexing series of events in early 1957, Ira D. Cardiff, a private 
citizen of Yakima, Washington found himself utterly confused about the facts 
surrounding the Downey-Fecteau case.  Hoping for a fuller explanation of Washington’s 
vague policy, Cardiff began writing to government officials, apparently annoying and 
worrying them in the process.  By early 1957, Cardiff had sent at least two letters to 
Congressman Hal Holmes of Washington state, but upon receiving no satisfactory reply 
from Holmes, Cardiff redirected his inquiries to the State Department.  Through his 
letters, Cardiff (unknowingly) did a great deal more than reveal the ambiguity of the case; 
even more than Ruth Boss’s 1954 letter, Cardiff’s correspondence helped to expose the 
lengths American officials would go to uphold their official story regarding Downey and 
Fecteau.  Similar to the experience of Steve Kiba upon his return to the U.S., the Cardiff 
affair demonstrated that American policy was meant not only to “play down,” but also to 
cover up the truth about the prisoners. 
In the first of his three letters to Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional 
Relations Robert Hill, written in March 1957, Cardiff questioned the “capacity of 
employment” of “the two ‘army civilian employees’ [Downey and Fecteau]…previous to 
their” imprisonment.130  Evidently the official succinct statement that Downey and 
Fecteau were simply civilians working for the Army Department had not satisfied 
Cardiff’s curiosity.  Upon receiving no reply, Cardiff sent the same letter again on April 
20, and then again two and a half weeks later.  Finally, on June 7, 1957, eleven weeks 
130 Ira Cardiff to Hill, 21 March 1957, 611.93241/3-2157, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, 
LM153 Roll #10.
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after his original letter to Hill, Cardiff received his long awaited reply.  In what was 
certainly a disappointment to Cardiff, John Meagher of the State Department informed 
him that records in Washington “do not contain any further details of the employment of 
the two American civilian employees of the Department of the Army.”131
The length of time it took for officials to send Cardiff a reply does not imply 
anything about the validity of its contents or a conscious unwillingness to deal with the 
issue.  Furthermore, the reply itself, while predictably vague, was not particularly 
incriminating.  Washington officials, however, had been concerned with Cardiff’s letters 
since they received the first one in March and it was their reaction to the letters within the 
State Department that is especially telling.  
Upon receiving the first of Cardiff’s letters to the State Department Marian Evans, 
working in the Public Services Division, noted to her superior that it would be ideal to 
“file the attached letter…without reply.”  Evans rightly anticipated, however, that Cardiff 
would not stop sending letters until he received an answer, and she questioned whether 
there was not some way to respond to him “without getting too involved.”  Furthermore, 
Evans wrote that to “avoid giving Mr. Cardiff another person to write to” – a strategy 
Cardiff had apparently used to get in touch with Assistant Secretary of State Hill – any 
correspondence to Cardiff would be signed in the Public Services Division, not 
forwarded to other State Department offices.132  A week later, during an interoffice 
131 John P. Meagher to Cardiff, 7 June 1957, 611.93241/5-757, RG 59, China Files 1955-
1959, LM153 Roll #10.
132 Marian Evans to Aylward, 10 May 1957, 611.93241/5-1057, RG 59, China Files 
1955-1959, LM153 Roll #10.
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conversation held solely to discuss Cardiff’s letters, high-level State Department officials 
agreed to Evan’s proposed approach.133
While all agreed that any reply to Cardiff – for the sake of ending his barrage of 
inquiries – would come from the Public Services Division, officials throughout the 
government contributed to its construction.  One State Department official had scribbled 
in the lower left corner of Cardiff’s third letter a note stating that Assistant Secretary Hill 
“requests [r]eply be coordinated with CIA,” demonstrating the intelligence agency’s 
interest in the Downey-Fecteau case.134  Further, on May 17 Ralph Clough, Deputy 
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, produced a “suggested reply” for Cardiff.  It 
was John Meagher of the Public Services Division who wrote the eventual reply noted 
above, but it followed Clough’s suggestion verbatim, and presumably was acceptable to 
the CIA and Secretary Dulles.  It was an ambiguous, weak response that merely restated 
what Cardiff already knew.135
While Cardiff himself got little out of this overdrawn letter fiasco in Washington, 
the episode emphasized just how intricate the government cover-up was.  The number of 
hands through which Cardiff’s letters passed, the amount of time spent on picking the 
exact words for a reply, and the degree of coordination between the State Department and 
the CIA reinforced how important it was to uphold the official U.S. story regarding the 
two men and how crucial it was to deny the truth from the public.  In this way, the 
Cardiff affair epitomized the American course of action that had prevailed since 
133 Memorandum on “Letter from Ira D. Cardiff,” E.R. Hipsley to John Meagher, 17 May 
1957, 611.93241/5-1757, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #10.
134 Note written on letter from Cardiff to State Department, 7 May 1957, 611.93241/5-
757, RG 59, China Files 1955-1959, LM153 Roll #10.
135 Ralph Clough to Marian Evans, 17 May 1957, 611.93241/5-1757, RG 59, China Files 
1955-1959, LM153 Roll #10.
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November 1954; despite officials’ implicit and at times frank acknowledgements of 
Downey and Fecteau’s employment by the CIA behind closed doors, they would 
continue to insist on a policy of ambiguity and outright deceptiveness when discussing 
the issue with the public.  This evasive policy was exactly what State Department 
officials had in mind when Walter McConaughy had written his 1954 memorandum.
By the end of 1957, with the ineffective policy of 1954 still intact, American 
officials had clearly abandoned the possibility of working with the Chinese to secure the 
release of the prisoners.  Zhou’s 1957 newsmen-prisoner exchange offer marked the last 
substantive opportunity to secure to the release of the prisoners.  Further, by that time the 
UN had long since abandoned the issue and Ambassadors Johnson and Wang had 
suspended their talks in Geneva.  By 1957 it appeared that the Chinese, too, had closed 
the door on cooperation with Washington.  This was due in part to China’s continuing 
frustration over the still lingering Taiwan issue.  Mao was convinced that improving 
Sino-American relations in order to resolve the Taiwan issue was neither possible nor 
desired.  More integral than Taiwan was the commencement of China’s “Great Leap 
Forward.”  With this new era in China, Beijing officials distanced themselves both from 
Russia – whose style of communism Mao viewed as lacking in revolutionary fervor – and 
from the West.136  The successful Russian satellite, Sputnik, furthermore, provided the 
Chinese with the confidence necessary to embark down this new path.  Thus 1957 
marked the climax, to some extent, in the Downey-Fecteau case.  Until Richard Nixon 
moved into the White House, ushering in a new era of Sino-American relations, it 
appeared that little could be accomplished on the prisoner issue.
136 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2001), 172.
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Chapter 2:  Onto the Backburner; 1957-1968
While 1957 marked what was to be the last official opportunity to secure the 
release of the prisoners until the 1970s, that year also saw the beginning of a series of 
initiatives by private citizens that would have a significant impact on the prisoner affair.  
Aside from approaching the prisoner affair with compassion, mercy, and openness –
techniques that were lost on American officials – these private citizens laid the basis for a 
policy that would secure the releases of John Downey and Richard Fecteau after 
government officials finally adopted it in the 1970s.  Aside from these private initiatives, 
however, 1957-1968 marked a low point in the Downey-Fecteau case.  For the remainder 
of Eisenhower’s administration, Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Christian 
Herter maintained the policy developed in 1954.137  Further, the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, busy with other, more pressing matters, and vulnerable to attacks from 
the Right, also did little to change course on the prisoner issue.  The Chinese, as well, 
seemed to lose interest in the prisoners as they backed away from the lenient, moderate 
approach that had characterized their policy from 1955-1957.  As a result, the prisoners’ 
fates ceased to be a high priority in Washington and Beijing; Downey, Fecteau, and 
concerned Americans found themselves again, forced to wait.   
137 In April 1959, a month before his death, Dulles resigned as Secretary of State.  Under 
Secretary of State, Christian Herter, replaced Dulles and held the position for the 
remainder of Eisenhower’s presidency.
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I
Prohibited for years from traveling to China to see her son and plead for his 
release, Mary Downey had discovered the difficulty in making any progress on the 
matter.  Despite her meetings – conducted in the few years following the Chinese 
broadcast – with Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, Ambassadors Henry Cabot 
Lodge and U. Alexis Johnson, Senator William Knowland, and Indian UN Representative 
Krishna Menon, Mrs. Downey often felt ignored and helpless.  Commenting on his July 
1957 meeting with Mrs. Downey, Ambassador Johnson recalled he “was not able to do 
much to relieve the very understandable anxieties and fears of a deeply distressed 
mother.”138
Helping Mrs. Downey toward her ultimate goal of seeing her son again, the 
United States, in late 1957, lifted its nearly three-year old prohibition of travel to the PRC 
for relatives of the prisoners.  Almost immediately Mrs. Downey began organizing her 
trip to China to visit John.  Planning to join Mrs. Downey on her trip were her other son, 
William, Richard Fecteau’s parents, and Ruth Redmond, whose son Hugh139 was in a 
Shanghai prison.140  In allowing the relatives to travel, the U.S. had abandoned, to some 
extent, its general travel policy on China, which had prohibited all such visits.  Further, 
officials helped the relatives prepare for their trips.  This assistance consisted mainly of 
issuing passports to the families and expediting the naturalization process for Mrs. 
138 Johnson to State Department, 5 July 1957, 611.95A251/7557, RG 59, North Korea 
Files 1955-1959, Box 2587.
139 In April 1951, Redmond, a representative of an American import-export company in 
Shanghai, was convicted of espionage and imprisoned.
140 According to Gup, The Book of Honor, 104, John Downey’s father opted not to travel 
to China because “he was unsure that he could control his anger.”
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Fecteau, who required American citizenship in order to receive a passport.141  American 
action in this regard should be commended, but despite this significant decision, 
America’s anti-Chinese travel policy was still visible.  Remnants of such policy could be 
seen most clearly in Dulles’s decision to express the American “two-China” policy on the 
relatives’ passports.142  In doing so, Dulles made clear that his decision to allow the 
relatives to visit China represented an exception to American policy, not a harbinger of 
fundamental and permanent change in the near future. 
Regardless of the decision’s implication on future policy, the families’ trip to 
China proceeded.  The relatives hoped to visit the prisoners over the Christmas holiday, 
but the three families could not coordinate such a trip quite so quickly.143  It was on New 
Year’s Eve that Mary and William Downey met Phillip and Jesse Fecteau in New York 
to begin their trip.  Mrs. Redmond joined the group the next day and the five of them 
commenced their journey, first to San Francisco, then to Hawaii, then to Tokyo, and then 
to Hong Kong.  At the Hong Kong-Chinese border the trip nearly ended abruptly when 
Chinese guards objected to certain words in the American passports that questioned PRC 
sovereignty.  The objection, provoked by Dulles’s insistence that America’s “two-China” 
policy be explicit, delayed entrance and frightened Mrs. Downey into thinking her 
141 Mrs. Jessie Fecteau, a native of Newfoundland, had not yet been naturalized when 
Dulles announced his decision to allow her to travel to China.  Instead of the normal 
thirty-day delay between application and naturalization, United States officials processed 
and approved Fecteau’s application in five days; Dana Adams Schmidt, “U.S. Captives’ 
Kin Ask Chinese Visas,” New York Times, 17 December 1957, 10 
142 While American officials had come to recognize the permanence of the Beijing 
government, officially they would recognize only the Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the 
true Chinese government.  This “two-China” policy would remain intact until the 
development of Sino-American détente in the 1970s.  
143 Schmidt, “U.S. Captives’ Kin Ask Chinese Visas,” New York Times, 17 December 
1957, 10.
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“journey had been in vain.”144  Fortunately, the matter was resolved and the five travelers 
entered China.  From the border, the Americans took a lengthy train ride west to Canton, 
from where the Downeys and Fecteaus took a plane to Beijing.  Mrs. Redmond traveled 
alone by plane to Shanghai, where her son was imprisoned.145
The Downeys and Fecteaus spent a total of eighteen days on this initial visit to 
China after the Chinese granted the families an extra week’s stay in the country.146  The 
Chinese permitted the families to see the prisoners every other day, for two hours at a 
time, giving them a total of seven meetings together.147  The sessions provided the 
families with the much needed time to enjoy John and Richard’s company and showed 
the prisoners to be in good shape both physically and mentally.  Mrs. Downey 
commented, “Jack looked well…his spirits were good…he never showed signs of 
depression.”148
To culminate their time together, on their seventh and last session with the 
prisoners, the families organized a good-bye lunch for the men.  In preparation, the two 
mothers “dashed around,” buying American-style food for their sons.  In the end, the 
lunch consisted of steaks, vegetables, coffee, and a great deal of ice cream that provided 
John Downey with fond memories of home.  The American feast was surely a welcomed 
144 Mary Downey as told to J. Robert Moskin, “A Mother’s Story…My Son Is a Prisoner 
in Red China,” Look, 6 December 1960, vol. 24, p. 72, 75-79.
145 While Redmond was imprisoned in a different prison than Downey and Fecteau 
indications are that his experiences had been quite similar to the other two men. 
146 Drumright to Dulles, 17 January 1958, 611.95A251/1-1758, RG 59, North Korea Files 
1955-1959, Box 2587.
147 During their time away from the prisoners, the relatives went sightseeing throughout 
China as guests of the Chinese Red Cross.  Drumright to Dulles, 27 January 1958, 
611.95A251/1- 2758, RG 59, North Korea Files 1955-1959, Box 2587.
148 Downey, “A Mother’s Story…My Son Is a Prisoner in Red China,” Look, 6 December 
1960, vol. 24, p. 72, 75-79.
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change from the “dull” food to which the men had grown accustomed.149  The lunch was 
also the first time that Mary and William Downey had met Richard Fecteau and it was 
likely the first encounter between Jessie and Phillip Fecteau and John Downey.  John and 
Richard, in fact, had only seen each other three times since their imprisonment,150 and 
thus the celebratory lunch was a rare treat for the two prisoners as well.
II
In addition to serving as a family reunion, the trip provided the relatives with the 
opportunity to confront the Chinese directly and plead for the men’s releases.  Mary 
Downey, who had already conducted such meetings in the U.S., took advantage of this 
opportunity, petitioning Foreign Minister Zhou for John’s freedom.  Though the Chinese 
assured Mrs. Downey that Zhou understood “the feelings behind” the appeal and that 
John’s good behavior could still bring about an earlier release, in the end, they denied her 
request.151  While the Downeys claimed to be “surprised” by the “speed of [the] 
rejection,” Mrs. Downey also commented that release of John at that point would have 
been a “miracle.”152
Like his mother, William Downey used his time abroad not only to see his brother 
but to try to secure his release as well.  William knew that John was guilty of the Chinese 
149 Ibid.; Drumright to Dulles, 27 January 1958, 611.95A251/1-2758, RG 59, North 
Korea Files 1955-1959, Box 2587.
150 Downey and Fecteau had been together for a photo session with the 11-member 
Arnold crew, on a tour of China, and most likely in 1957 when the American students 
came to visit both men.  Drumright to Dulles, 27 January 1958, 611.95A251/1-2758, RG 
59, North Korea Files 1955-1959, Box 2587.
151 Downey, “A Mother’s Story…My Son Is a Prisoner in Red China,” Look, 6 December 
1960, vol. 24, p. 72, 75-79.
152 Ibid.; Drumright to Dulles, 27 January 1958, 611.95A251/1-2758, RG 59, North 
Korea Files 1955-1959, Box 2587.
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charges and thus his efforts to free his brother, like those of Mary Downey, relied on 
compassion, not on proving John’s innocence.153  Differing in technique from his mother, 
though, William attempted to free John through the Chinese legal system – the institution 
that many in America blamed for the prisoners’ captivity.  In July 1959, after visiting his 
brother in China, William Downey, with the help of Hong Kong lawyer Percy Chen, 
commenced the process of appealing John’s sentence.  On October 1 William submitted 
to the Chinese Supreme People’s Court an appeal for the release of John Downey.
Compared to the initiatives of the U.S. government, the appeal was quite 
remarkable.  First, it carefully stressed the private nature of the lawsuit.  A criminal case 
such as Downey’s, the appeal insisted, “is purely a matter within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state.”  As such, there was no room for outside involvement from any 
“foreign country [clearly referring to the U.S.] or…the United Nations.”  Second, the 
appeal did not harp on international settlements such as the Korean Armistice Agreement 
or, implicitly, the Sino-American Agreed Announcement made at Geneva.154  Third, the 
appeal made clear that the Downeys were protesting “against the sentence and not against 
[the] conviction.”  Implicitly accepting John Downey’s guilt, the appeal argued that a life 
153 In January 1958, during one of William’s visits with his brother, John remarked that 
“he [was] getting what he deserved.” Coming during one of William’s meetings with 
John in the Chinese prison, the remark was never made public, but its occurrence surely 
struck a blow to William’s personal belief that his brother was innocent.  Drumright to 
Dulles, 27 January 1958, 611.95A251/1-2758, RG 59, North Korea Files 1955-1959, Box 
2587.
154 “Petition by way of Appeal of John Downey against sentence of life imprisonment 
passed on him by the Military Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s 
Republic of China on 23rd November 1954,” attached to Jacobson to American Consulate 
General in Hong Kong, 11 August 1960, 293.1111-Downey, John Thomas, RG 59, China 
Files 1967-1969, Box 258.
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sentence was far too harsh in light of the prisoner’s youth, the precepts of socialism, and 
China’s “traditional…spirit of humanitarianism.”155
While William and his mother differed in their specific tactics, both strategies 
sought mercy and closure and were, in that respect, stark contrast from Dulles’s calls for 
“punishment” and “compensation.”156  Despite the Downeys’ refreshing approaches, in 
the end, their appeals failed.  The Chinese court rejected Will Downey’s appeal and Mrs. 
Downey’s initial trip abroad ended with John still in jail and no release on the horizon.  
Further, aside from any personal relief that the 1958 trip brought to the Downeys and 
Fecteaus, this initial visit appeared to have done little to advance the ultimate goal of 
releasing the men.  Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s hopes, in early 1955, that visits 
and personal appeals from family members would expedite the release process, never 
materialized.
III
Part of the reason that these early private initiatives had little success was that 
they were not supported, in any significant way, by a shift in official American policy.  
Throughout the whole of Eisenhower’s administration the precedent set by Secretary of 
State Dulles held strong.  Moreover, the election of 1960, which ushered in nearly a 
decade of Democratic leadership, did practically nothing to reverse this course.  In part, 
this was due to the relative continuity between the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson 
administrations.  Over a dozen high-level Eisenhower officials, throughout the State 
155 Ibid.
156 American Consul Geneva to American Embassy London, 25 November 1954, 
611.95A241/11-2554, RG 59, North Korea Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
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Department and White House, found themselves with influential positions in the 
Democratic administrations.  Several, including Walter McConaughy, Ralph Clough, 
Edwin Martin, and U. Alexis Johnson, had been directly involved in constructing 
American policy on Downey and Fecteau.
Just as important to the continuation of Dulles’s policy in the 1960s were 
international relations, and their impact at home.  With the Cold War still going strong in 
that decade and with American distrust and animus toward the PRC still intense, 
Democratic presidents saw little political benefit in altering the inherited policy on the 
prisoner issue.  Furthermore, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson carried 
the extra burden of being members of the party that had, according to leading 
Republicans, “lost” China and contaminated the State Department with communist 
sympathizers.  It had been Dulles and his conservative allies in Congress, moreover, who 
were responsible for many of these accusations.  This stigma, largely unfair yet present 
nonetheless, made relative consistency with the Eisenhower administration, specifically 
on relations with China, especially appealing to the vulnerable Democratic 
administrations.  Even without this stigma, monumental events such as the Bay of Pigs 
disaster, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the creation of the Berlin Wall, and the ever-escalating 
Vietnam War, monopolized the attention of Kennedy and Johnson; the fates of Downey 
and Fecteau were dwarfed by comparison.
Changes in China, too, are responsible for the failure to resolve the prisoner issue.  
With the commencement of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s the Chinese further 
abandoned the moderate foreign policy they employed in the previous decade.  With the 
launch of Russia’s Sputnik in 1957 and the Chinese acquisition of an atomic bomb in 
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1964, the Chinese enjoyed the confidence necessary to carry out a more revolutionary 
and anti-American foreign policy.  Refusing to cooperate with the United States, the 
Chinese made even more difficult any resolution on the prisoners.
China’s new course of action reinforced to American officials the importance of 
standing firm on Cold War policy.  Thus, without any sufficient reason to shift American 
policy on the prisoners – and with significant reasons not to – Kennedy and Johnson 
followed, for the most part, the blueprint that Dulles had developed.  Just as Washington 
officials had throughout the 1950s, Kennedy and Johnson responded to passionate calls 
for the prisoners’ releases from relatives, concerned citizens, and American politicians 
with familiar assurances that the U.S. government was “actively and continuously 
concerned” with the fates of Downey and Fecteau.157  Furthermore, American officials 
continued referring to the September 10 Agreed Announcement – which, according to 
American officials, had yet to bring about the desired or intended results – as evidence 
that it was the Chinese, not the Americans, whose inaction was prolonging Downey and 
Fecteau’s imprisonments.158
More than just representing an absence of change, the policies of Kennedy and 
Johnson marginalized the prisoner issue.  During the 1950s President Eisenhower and 
Secretary of State Dulles had regularly dealt with the prisoner affair in public.  Both men 
spoke about Downey, Fecteau, and the other prisoners at several press conferences a year 
157 This phrase was part of a standard reply letter that can be found in Frederick G. 
Dutton to Senator Magnuson, 8 January 1962, 611.93251/1-862, RG 59, China Files 
1960-1963, M1855 Roll #126; and Dutton to Congressman Bates, 30 April 1962, 
611.95A241/4- 1762, RG 59, North Korea Files 1960-1963, M1855 Roll #133.
158 Such a argument was laid out in “Americans Imprisoned in Communist China,” 
attached to David Dean to Shepherd, no date, POL 7-1 US-CHICOM/Downey, John 
Thomas, RG 59, China Files 1967-1969, Box 258.
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and Eisenhower referred to them in two State of the Union addresses.  Further, it was the 
Eisenhower administration that had initially brought the prisoner issue to the floor of the 
UN.  Conversely, while curious and concerned Americans prevented Kennedy and 
Johnson from completely dismissing the prisoner issue, the 1960s marked a significant 
decline in the publicity of the Downey-Fecteau case.  Unlike the frequent – yet 
ineffective – attention given by Eisenhower and Dulles, Kennedy spoke publicly about 
the men only four times, and Johnson never mentioned them at all.         
The decline in interest can be blamed in part on the consistently malevolent nature 
of Sino-American relations and in part on the stalemate on the prisoners that had 
developed by the end of 1957.  With diplomatic efforts having expired and American 
presidents refusing to cooperate with the Chinese, American policy presented little hope 
of bringing the prisoners home.  In China, as well, the brief period of conciliation with 
the U.S. beginning in 1955 ended in 1957, making resolution on the prisoner issue more 
difficult.159  This decline of both progress and opportunity effectively turned the fates of 
Downey and Fecteau into non-issues as both countries seemed content to leave the 
prisoner question on the backburner for the time being.  It would take the dramatic shift 
in Sino-American relations upon Richard Nixon’s election to reinvigorate public and 
governmental interest in Downey and Fecteau. 
IV
Serving as exceptions to the fatigue that washed over the American public in the 
1960s, a series of international events during the decade sparked a resurgence of interest 
159 Chang, Friends and Enemies, 162
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– albeit short-lived – in the Downey-Fecteau case.  In 1962 the Russians released 
American pilot Gary Powers, who had been in prison since May 1, 1960 after Soviet 
forces shot down his U-2 spy plane over Russia.   That same year the new Cuban 
government released from prison over 1,000 Cuban exiles who were involved in a CIA-
led attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro’s communist regime in April 1961.  Finally, in late 
1968 the North Koreans released the crew of the USS Pueblo, the members of which had 
been imprisoned in January of that year for attempted espionage. 
More significant than the news of the prisoners’ releases was the manner in which 
the U.S. secured them.  While the Russians maintained that they released Powers as a 
good will gesture, he likely was swapped for a Russian spy being held in a U.S. prison.  
The release of the Cuban exiles unquestionably was the result of a $53 million ransom in 
food and medical supplies paid to the Cuban government from various sources in 
America.  Finally, the Pueblo crew’s release appears to have been the result of American 
diplomacy and an official apology to the North Koreans.160  While certainly pleased by 
the release of the prisoners, many Americans could not help thinking that their 
government could and should take these same actions to secure the releases of Downey 
and Fecteau.  
To this end, several American politicians and private citizens wrote to 
Washington officials demanding that Downey and Fecteau be given the same attention as 
the other prisoners.  It was the release of the Cubans that appeared most promising to 
concerned Americans.  Congressman Thomas Lane, for one, hoped that the Cuban 
160 While Americans agreed to sign a confession, it was understood by both the 
Americans and the North Koreans that American officials would immediately repudiate it 
as “complete fabrication,” Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the 
President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), 466-67.
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example “offers hope that Communist China will be receptive to similar negotiations.”161
Further, at the few press conferences in which Kennedy was forced to address Downey 
and Fecteau, it was usually in response to questions regarding a food-for-prisoners 
exchange with the Chinese.  Unfortunately, as President Kennedy pointed out, the 
Chinese government had never requested such aid from the United States, meaning that 
an exchange offer was certainly not on the table.  Kennedy’s unwillingness to exchange 
food for prisoners was not, however, simply due to the lack of Chinese initiative.  In 
language reminiscent of Dulles several years earlier, Kennedy assured the public that 
even if the Chinese had made such an offer, the United States would likely pass since he 
was still soured by Downey and Fecteau’s unjust imprisonments.162  Rejecting outright a 
proposal that had yet to be made, Kennedy’s statement reinforced the staying power of 
Dulles’s stubborn policy.
V
In the 1960s, with almost no action from the Chinese or American governments, 
the only significant developments on the prisoner issue came in the form of private 
initiatives.  Following her trip in 1958, Mary Downey, often accompanied by her son 
William, revisited John five more times before he was released.  Despite the seriousness 
and unusual nature of the situation, Mrs. Downey’s trips to see John fell into a kind of 
routine.  The Chinese allowed Mrs. Downey to visit with her son for several two-hour 
161 Thomas Lane to Dean Rusk, 27 December 1962, 293.1111-Fecteau, Richard/12-2762, 
RG 59, China Files 1967-1969, Box 258.
162 Kennedy was responding to a Peace Corps official’s question on the potential of 
sending food to the PRC. “Remarks at a Meeting with the Headquarters Staff of the Peace 
Corps,” 14 June 1962, Public Papers of the President of the United States, John F. 
Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), 487-88.
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sessions during her stay and she was able to bring gifts for John and Richard.163  Her 
visits would usually bring her a sense of relief as she found her son in good shape and 
good spirits but, despite Chinese assurances that John’s sentence could be shortened, 
Chinese officials consistently rejected her pleas for his release.164
As the frustrated Downeys were traveling to and from China, a college 
acquaintance of John Downey, Jerome Cohen, was also busy developing an ingenious 
strategy meant to secure his old friend’s freedom.  Since 1966, when Downey’s 
imprisonment was the hot topic at Cohen’s fifteenth year Yale reunion, Cohen had been 
actively involved in the case.  At the reunion the class of 1951 selected Cohen, a legal 
scholar specializing in Asian law, to head any action on behalf of Downey’s release.  
Even before taking on this new responsibility, Cohen’s profession forced him to 
spend a great deal of time corresponding and meeting with Chinese diplomats and 
government officials.  With no official diplomatic relations between the United States 
and the PRC throughout Downey’s imprisonment, however, Cohen frequently found 
himself in Ottawa meeting with China’s Ambassador to Canada, Huang Hua.  
Throughout the two men’s numerous discussions, on all aspects of Sino-American 
relations, Downey’s case often made an appearance.  In the course of these meetings, 
163 Mrs. Downey mentioned that she brought cigars, cigarettes, and magazines for 
Fecteau but she was not able to see him.  “U.S. Woman Visits Son in Peiping Jail,” New 
York Times, 17 August 1960, 11.
164 Examples of such assurances by the Chinese can be found in “Mrs. Downey Hopes 
China Will Free Son,” New York Times, 26 August 1960, 2; Associated Press, “Mrs. 
Downey Home From China,” New York Times, 27 August 1960, 3; Reuters, “Mrs. 
Downey Fails in Plea to Red China to Free Son,” New York Times, 27 May 1962, 14; 
Associated Press, “China Said to Review Jailed American’s Case,” New York Times, 15 
November 1971, 13.
79
Cohen regularly brought up a “face saving” plan to expedite Downey’s release, a plan he 
would continue to press for until the Chinese eventually set Downey free.  
Like others involved in the case, Cohen knew that Downey was a CIA agent; he 
clearly remembered representatives from the new agency “recruit[ing]” Downey several 
years after it had been established.165  Cohen suggested to Huang that if the United States 
would simply admit this to China, the Chinese could release Downey without appearing 
weak.  Though Cohen was the first American to advocate outright such an idea, the 
strategy was not new.  Upon his return to the U.S, Steve Kiba had informed American 
officials that the Chinese would certainly welcome such an approach.  Further, Cohen’s 
“face saving” plan was based on the same rationale as Hammarskjold’s proposal in 1955 
to send the prisoners’ families to the PRC; both gave the Chinese a way to release the 
prisoners without losing credibility and strength on the international stage.
Huang regularly was noncommittal to Cohen’s proposal.  Like Kiba, Huang was 
sure that the Chinese would accept such a deal, but the Ambassador held no authority to 
execute such a policy and thus he was not able to give Cohen any guarantees.166  Cohen, 
as well, had no official affiliation with the American administrations of the 1960s and 
thus his initial proposal had no governmental backing.  With high-level American and 
Chinese officials keeping their distance from Cohen’s strategy during the 1960s, the 
“face saving” scheme, like others before it, was unable to achieve its goal.  
165 The details of Downey’s recruitment were very similar to those of other college 
students whom the CIA selected in the early years of the Cold War.  CIA recruiters 
visited prestigious universities throughout the country recruiting bright young men 
seeking adventure.  According to Jerome Cohen, out of the thirty Yale students interested 
in the job, the CIA accepted only six.  Leary, Perilous Missions, 139; Breuer, Shadow 
Warriors, 216; Jerome Cohen interview, 2 December 2003. 
166 Cohen interview.
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Regardless of its initial failure, Cohen’s actions continued on the heels of what 
Mary and William Downey had begun years earlier, and in this way his initiative was 
significant.  Further, when the Chinese finally released Downey in 1973, it was due to 
Nixon’s admission that Downey and Fecteau had been working for the CIA when the 
Chinese had captured them two decades earlier.  Thus, if nothing else, Cohen’s meetings 
highlighted just how easy it would have been for American officials to secure Downey 
and Fecteau’s releases earlier than they did.  Had officials in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
or Johnson administrations simply acknowledged the truth regarding the two men’s 
employment, the course of Downey and Fecteau’s imprisonments might very well have 
worked out differently.
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Chapter 3:  Clearing the Slate; 1969-1973
That John Downey and Richard Fecteau could never receive the government 
attention and action they required as long as Sino-American relations remained 
unfriendly reinforced how closely linked the prisoners’ fates were to the Cold War as a 
whole.  It made sense, therefore, that a true shift in American policy on the prisoners 
emerged only with the election of Richard Nixon and the commencement of Sino-
American détente.167  With Sino-Soviet tensions at a high point and American success in 
Vietnam being consistently frustrated, Chinese and American officials saw advantages to 
a more conciliatory relationship between their countries.168  In the 1970s both nations’ 
governments loosened restrictions on travel and trade, and Nixon provided the PRC with 
a degree of respect and legitimacy that previous presidents had intentionally and 
adamantly withheld.  It was only in this unprecedented period of rapprochement that both 
countries could agree upon terms of release for the remaining American prisoners in 
China.169
167 In February 1972, in order to reinforce symbolically his commitment to Sino-
American détente, Nixon, after stepping off his plane in China, “made a point of 
extending [his] hand” in order to shake Zhou Enlai’s hand.  Such a gesture was meant to 
placate Zhou, who had been insulted by Secretary Dulles at the Geneva Conference in 
1954 when the Secretary refused to shake the Foreign Minister’s hand.  Richard Nixon, 
The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 559.
168 Nixon hoped to intimidate Hanoi officials into negotiating by increasing his 
cooperation with Beijing.  Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, 
179-84.
169 In addition to Downey and Fecteau, the Chinese were also holding Major Philip E. 
Smith of the Air Force, Lieutenant Commander Robert J. Flynn of the Navy, and Mary 
Ann Harbert, an American civilian.  Smith was shot down and captured by the Chinese in 
1965, as was Flynn in 1967.  Both men had been fleeing from North Vietnamese fighter 
jets when they crossed into the PRC.  Harbert’s yacht had accidentally crossed into 
Chinese water when the Chinese captured her in 1968.  The Chinese released Harbert in 
December 1971 along with Richard Fecteau, and released Smith and Flynn on March 15, 
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Throughout 1971 and early 1972, in light of Nixon’s coming trip to the PRC in 
February 1972, politicians and private citizens bombarded the President with letters 
urging Nixon to work out a release for Downey and Fecteau during his visit.  Like earlier 
correspondence to the Eisenhower administration, these letters expressed personal 
sympathy with the two prisoners and a strong desire to see their return to the U.S.  They 
differed significantly, however, in their lack of inflammatory accusations – so common in 
earlier letters – which blamed the Chinese alone for the imprisonments.  
What occupied most of the letters instead was praise for Nixon’s proposed trip as 
a step toward world peace.  In this way, some saw negotiations on the release of the two 
prisoners, also, as a step toward this eventual international harmony.  As Connecticut 
Congresswoman Ella Grasso noted in a letter to Nixon, the release of Downey and 
Fecteau “would serve as a beacon of hope and a symbol of trust both to people of our 
country and throughout the world.”170  The contrast between Grasso’s letter and that of 
Connecticut Congressman Thomas Dodd in 1954, in which Dodd insisted that the United 
States “move beyond…diplomatic protest” if Downey and Fecteau were not released, is 
1973.  Footnote to “Press Conference Remarks,” Public Papers of the President of the 
United States, Richard Nixon, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1975), 63 (hereinafter PPRN, and year); Henry Tanner, “Senator Scott 
Foresees Vietnam Pullout by May,” New York Times, 19 July 1971, 1, 10; R. W. Apple, 
Jr., “U.S. and China Will Soon Set Up Offices in Capitals for Liaison; Peking to Free 
Two Americans,” New York Times, 23 February 1973, 1, 15; Associated Press, “Chinese 
Release Fecteau but Keep Downey in Prison,” New York Times, 13 December 1971, 1, 
25.
170 Ella Grasso to Richard Nixon, 19 July 1971, TR24C034-2, Nixon Presidential 
Material, White House Central Files (hereinafter WHCF), Trip Files, Box 58.
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striking.171  Change was also apparent in Nixon’s responses to the letters.  In his replies 
Nixon, like Dulles before him, acknowledged the problem and made clear his 
determination to secure the release of the men.  Differing from the Secretary of State, 
however, Nixon made clear that if he pursued the prisoner issue during his February trip, 
the men’s releases, not the punishment of PRC officials, would be his main concern.172
Clearly, American politicians had rearranged their priorities in accordance with Sino-
American détente, now placing the releases of the two Americans above (or squarely 
within the new) Cold War politics.  If securing the freedom of Downey and Fecteau were 
merely a political tactic to better Sino-American relations or simply a side effect of 
détente, at least American Cold War policy in the 1970s was compatible with ending the 
Americans’ imprisonments.
More significant than Nixon’s correspondence, American officials were inching 
toward a total admission of guilt in the prisoner affair.  Helping it on this path was 
Downey’s college acquaintance, Jerome Cohen.  Still set on securing Downey’s release, 
Cohen continued to push his “face saving” plan on anyone who would listen.  He had 
struggled in this quest throughout the 1960s (only Chinese Ambassador to Canada, 
Huang Hua, listened extensively), but in summer 1971 Cohen found a willing ear when 
he addressed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  As a legal expert on the PRC 
Cohen, along with two other China experts, testified to Senator William Fulbright’s 
committee on current Sino-American relations.173  During his address, Cohen delved into 
171 Dodd to Eisenhower, 30 November 1954, 611.95A241/11-3054, RG 59, North Korea 
Files 1950-1954, Box 2886.
172 Nixon to Francis W. Sargent, 8 October 1971, TR24 JL3 C034-2, Nixon Presidential 
Material, WHCF, Trip Files, Box 59.
173 Barbara Tuchman and Arthur Galston testified along with Cohen.
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the still unresolved case of Downey and Fecteau.  Cohen’s testimony was very blunt; he 
informed the Senator that the truth of the case was very much as the Chinese had been 
alleging since November 1954.  Seeing the facts of the case as “rather clear,” Cohen 
could not understand why the United States government had not confessed years earlier.  
Using the notable Pueblo incident of 1968 as an example, Cohen noted that even though 
that situation involved a “more ambiguous…violation of international law,” American 
officials quickly had made both an “apology and confession.”174
The solution, as Cohen saw it, was for American officials to carry out his “face-
saving” plan.  He explained that the 1970s were “a very different era” in regard to Sino-
American relations, and if the United States government would both “admit that the facts 
are as stated by the Chinese” and display “regret for the whole incident,” it was likely 
that the Chinese would release the prisoners.175  Senator Fulbright’s response to Cohen’s 
address, while not remarkable, was significant in its distinction from earlier official 
statements.  There was no mechanical return, on Fulbright’s part, to the official story 
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s.  Further, there was no resort to the ambiguity, brevity, 
or deceit proposed in the 1954 McConaughy memorandum.  While the senator appeared 
somewhat unfamiliar with the details of the Downey-Fecteau case, he seemed more than 
willing to use any strategy necessary to hasten the prisoners’ releases.  Fulbright 
174 Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, 25 June 1971, Hearings Before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, United States 




concluded his dialogue by assuring Cohen that he would recommend the “face-saving” 
plan to the State Department.176
In addition to Cohen’s testimony, secret meetings between Nixon’s National 
Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai in summer 1971 
foreshadowed significant change in American policy on the prisoners.  Beginning in July, 
the talks were a means of commencing a diplomatic and civil relationship between the 
two countries, and while the main objective of the meetings was to resolve, or at least 
discuss, the Taiwan issue, Zhou and Kissinger exchanged words on the remaining 
American prisoners in China.  During the talks, Kissinger’s demeanor was humble and he 
repeatedly made clear that the American government no longer maintained that the 
imprisonments had been a violation of international law; releasing Downey, Fecteau, and 
the other Americans would be “a favor,” and “an act of mercy.”177  This new approach 
was reminiscent of private attempts, made a decade earlier, which stressed the importance 
of compassion and not necessarily justice.  Further, by stressing that the Chinese had 
never violated international law by imprisoning the Americans, Kissinger was rapidly 
moving toward total admission of guilt.
America’s new approach to the prisoner issue seemed to pay off immediately; in 
December 1971, two months before Nixon departed for the PRC, the Chinese released 
forty-four year old Richard Fecteau, after the American had served seventeen years of his 
twenty-year sentence.  In addition, the Chinese announced they had commuted John 
176 Ibid.,154.
177 Memo on “U.S. Prisoners of War,” 11 October 1971, Nixon Presidential Material, 
NSC Files, Box 1034.
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Downey’s sentence to five remaining years, placing his expected release late in 1976.178
The Chinese action marked the first positive development in the prisoner affair since the 
Chinese had released John Arnold’s crew in summer 1955.  Unlike the American 
response at that time, however, Nixon officials recognized the 1971 release and 
commutation as a “good-will gesture” on the part of the Chinese.179
The excited atmosphere surrounding both Sino-American détente in general and 
progress on the prisoner issue in particular, could easily blind one to the fact that 
Washington officials in the early 1970s had not yet abandoned completely the policy of 
prior decades.  The Chinese decisions to release Fecteau three years early and to reduce 
Downey’s life sentence signified, for the most part, Sino-American détente, not total 
American disclosure of the truth about the prisoners.  While Fulbright’s response to 
Cohen and Kissinger’s private comments to Zhou were large steps forward, newspapers, 
government memoranda, and Washington officials in the early 1970s still referred to 
Downey and Fecteau as “civilian Army employees,” and their fateful mission as a 
“routine flight from Korea to Japan.”  The State Department, as well, “still refused to 
concede” that Downey and Fecteau had been CIA employees.180  Even Nixon’s 
correspondence on the prisoner issue – while lacking the adamant rejection of guilt that 
had characterized earlier government documents – in no way professed America’s 
culpability.
178 “A Present From Zhou,” Newsweek, 27 December 1971.
179 “Chinese Release Fecteau but Keep Downey in Prison,” New York Times, 13 
December 1971, 1, 25.
180 Associated Press, “U.S. Won’t Concede Or Deny Fecteau Was on Spy Mission,” 
Washington Post, 15 December 1971, 27.
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II
Fortunately for Downey, these remnants of decades past faded fast.  In addition to 
reviewing Cohen’s “face saving” plan, the State Department had, by 1971, “modified” its 
own response to questions surrounding Downey and Fecteau’s employment in the CIA 
from one of adamant denial to one of dispassionate silence.  Still not admitting outright 
the men’s guilt, officials insisted they would “no longer deny the charges” either.181
While this taciturn response could hardly be taken as admission, the modified approach 
was, nonetheless, a refreshing shift from the hostile and overly defensive policy of 
Secretary Dulles.
Even more remarkable was Nixon’s statement on January 31, 1973, in which he 
admitted for the first time that there was some connection between the CIA and Downey 
and Fecteau’s 1952 mission.  Asked by a reporter about the possible release of Downey 
from the Chinese prison, Nixon responded that Downey’s was a “different case” since it 
“involves a C.I.A. agent.”  Nixon further commented that any release of Downey must be 
up to the Chinese, and “bellicose statements” emanating from Washington would not 
help “in getting his release.”182  Despite the monumental importance of Nixon’s 
statement, the comment was still not a straightforward or comprehensive 
acknowledgement of Downey and Fecteau’s employment in the CIA and was certainly 
not an admission to Washington’s complicity in and cover-up of their espionage 
activities.  While most newspapers took the President’s statement to be a complete 
admission to Downey and Fecteau’s involvement in the CIA, his indirectness led one 
New England newspaper to question whether Nixon’s response had been intended, or 
181 Ibid.
182 Nixon, “Press Conference Remarks,” 31 January 1973, PPRN, 1973, 62-63.
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merely “a slip of the tongue.”183  Further, the brevity of Nixon’s response raised the 
possibility that he had not been intending to make a prepared, definitive statement 
regarding Downey’s employment.184
Any thoughts that Nixon’s press conference statement had been unintended or 
intentionally vague were made moot in the following weeks.  Following the news 
conference, Nixon made no attempt to deny his implication of a Downey-CIA link.  
Furthermore, one New York Times article possibly misinterpreted Nixon’s response on 
Downey’s employment; the article reported that Nixon “conceded…that [Downey] was 
an agent of the C.I.A.”185  As the transcript makes clear, Nixon made no such clear-cut 
statement.  In light of the fact that there was no backlash on the part of the Nixon 
administration against the Times’, however, it appears that the disparity between the 
newspaper report and Nixon’s actual statement was one of semantics, not fundamental 
differences.  
Cohen’s testimony to Fulbright’s committee, Kissinger’s talks with Zhou, the 
slight shift in State Department policy, and Nixon’s admission all showed that American 
priorities had changed; no longer was making the Chinese look like international enemies 
of greater or equal importance than securing the release of the remaining Americans.  
Further, as U.S. and PRC officials continued their efforts to secure a hospitable 
relationship with each other, it became casually accepted that the CIA had employed John 
183 Robert Waters, “Nixon’s Reference to Downey – A Slip or a Message to China?,” 
Hartford Courant, 10 February 1973.
184 This possibility was amplified due to Nixon’s error when discussing Downey’s prison 
sentence.  When discussing China’s commutation of Downey’s sentence, Nixon 
incorrectly stated that Downey’s sentence had originally been thirty years.  Nixon, “Press 
Conference Remarks,” 31 January 1973, PPRN, 1973, 63.
185 Apple, “U.S. and China Will Soon Set Up Offices in Capitals for Liaison; Peking to 
Free Two Americans,” New York Times, 23 February 1973, 1, 15.
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Downey (and by implication Richard Fecteau), and had orchestrated the doomed 1952 
mission – two facts that the Chinese and numerous Americans had known since the 
1950s.186  By 1973 national newspapers, which had previously been careful to preface 
Downey and Fecteau’s involvement in the CIA with phrases such as “according to the 
Chinese,” and “allegedly” now explicitly described Downey as “an agent of the Central 
Intelligence Agency,” and a “C.I.A. prisoner.”187  Clearly, United States officials and the 
American public had accepted the actuality of Downey and Fecteau as CIA agents and 
were ready to use that concession to secure Downey’s release.
III
While Sino-American détente and constructive efforts within Washington and 
Beijing made Downey’s release inevitable, it was the ailing health of Downey’s mother 
in March 1973 that supposedly served as the main impetus for immediate action.  With 
the help of Governor Thomas J. Meskill of Connecticut, a boyhood friend of Downey, 
Nixon worked out an agreement with the Chinese to hasten Downey’s release.  In light of 
186 In addition to Secretary of State Dulles, top CIA officials certainly knew of the 
prisoners’ guilt as well.  CIA Director Richard Helms, testifying before the Senate 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities in 1973 used Downey and Fecteau as 
examples of how the CIA dealt with agents captured abroad.  He explained that during 
their imprisonments “their salaries were paid just as though they were on our rolls, so 
when they came out they had quite a tidy piece of money to take care of them for 
whatever period of time they wanted to use it for.”  Testimony of Richard Helms, 
“Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the 
United States Senate,” 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Presidential Campaign Activities of 
1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 3277.
187 Such labels can be found in Apple, “U.S. and China Will Soon Set Up Offices in 
Capitals for Liaison; Peking to Free Two Americans,” New York Times, 23 February 
1973, 1, 15; “China to Free Downey of the C.I.A. Monday,” New York Times, 10 March 
1973, 1; and Lawrence Fellows, “Peking’s 20-Year C.I.A. Prisoner: John Thomas 
Downey,” New York Times, 10 March 1973, 10.
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Mary Downey’s health, Foreign Minister Zhou promised to release John Downey, now 
forty-two, on March 12, 1973.188  The Nixon administration welcomed the announcement 
with celebration, and Washington officials rightfully recognized the Chinese for their 
integral role in the release.    
Regardless of the cover story, however, Mrs. Downey’s health was not the true 
reason for John’s release; claiming that it was cast the Chinese as a philanthropic people 
and allowed American officials to sidestep, yet again, the ugly political reasons behind 
Downey’s twenty-year imprisonment in the first place.  The actual decision to release 
John Downey had come before his mother fell ill, during additional Zhou-Kissinger talks 
in February 1973.  At that time Zhou made it clear to Kissinger that while Downey would 
certainly be freed, his release “would be expedited” if the Americans were to give the 
Chinese “a compassionate reason” to do so.  Such a reason emerged one month later with 
Mrs. Downey’s failing health.189  But Kissinger and Zhou both knew that the true reason 
behind the release was Nixon’s admission that Downey and Fecteau were indeed CIA 
agents – a concession that, unlike Mrs. Downey’s failing health, could have easily come 
twenty years earlier. 
Whatever China’s actual reason for the release, on March 12 a “smiling” John 
Thomas Downey crossed over the Chinese border into Hong Kong.  Newspapers reported 
him to be “in good shape” and he appeared thrilled and appreciative regarding his release.  
From Hong Kong, Downey flew to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, where his 
brother William greeted him.  Together the two brothers then flew to Hartford, 
188 In addition to releasing Downey, Zhou promised to release Major Smith and 
Lieutenant Commander Flynn on March 15, 1973.  United Press International, “China to 
Free Downey of the C.I.A. Monday,” New York Times, 10 March 1973, 1.
189 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 70.
91
Connecticut to spend time with their critically ill mother.190  With the release, Kissinger 
later commented, Beijing and Washington had cleared “the slate at last of the human 
legacies of the period of hostility between” the two nations.191
Upon their returns, both Richard Fecteau and John Downey attempted to live 
normal lives, acknowledging their pasts but looking toward their futures.  Fecteau 
rejoined the CIA, where he remained until 1976.  The next year he accepted an offer to 
work as the assistant athletic director at his alma mater, Boston University, a job he kept 
for twelve years.192  In 1973 Downey retired from the CIA and applied to law school, 
twenty-two years after graduating from college.  With the assistance of his friend, Jerome 
Cohen, now a professor of law at Harvard, Downey entered Harvard Law School and 
upon graduation joined a small law firm in Connecticut.193  Starting in 1978 he tried his 
luck at politics, running unsuccessfully for the lieutenant governorship and a seat in the 
U.S. Senate.  In 1987, following his failed political bids, Governor William O’Neill of 
Connecticut appointed Downey a state court judge, a position he holds to this day.194
190 “Downey, Released By China, Crosses Hong Kong Border,” New York Times, 12 
March 1973, 9; Henry S. Bradsher, “Free After 20 Years,” Evening Star and Daily News 
(Washington, D.C), 12 March 1973, 1.
191 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 70.
192 Daniel, “Former POW Finds Freedom by Making Peace With Past,” Boston Globe, 11 
July 1999, 1; Bill Peterson, “Making Up For 20 ½ Lost Years,” Washington Post, 19 July 
1978, 1, 11.
193 According to Cohen, he recommended Downey’s admission on the friendly 
understanding that once a year, Downey would discuss his twenty-year ordeal with 
Cohen and law students.  Cohen interview.
194 Peterson, “Making Up For 20 ½ Lost Years,” Washington Post, 19 July 1978, 1, 11; 
Richard Madden, “Former C.I.A. Agent May Seek Weicker’s Seat in U.S. Senate,” New 
York Times, 15 April 1981, B-2.
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Conclusion
In an effort to move past the divisive prisoner issue, or at least to lessen its 
volatility, the Chinese government, in September 1983, invited Downey to visit the PRC 
in what would be his first visit to the country since his return to the United States.  The 
Chinese intended the trip as a good-will gesture and Downey took it as such, adding that 
he “felt no bitterness” toward Chinese at that time, nor had he ever felt bitterness toward 
them throughout the ordeal.195  Aside from the “good will” aspect of the trip, Downey’s 
visit allowed him to speak with Chinese officials and gain a better understanding of the 
details surrounding his capture and imprisonment.
While the Chinese appeared to be reaching out to the U.S. in regard to the still-
lingering prisoner issue, American officials seemed content reverting to a policy 
reminiscent of decades past.  This can be seen most clearly in the events of June 25, 
1998, when CIA Director George Tenet hailed both Downey and Fecteau as heroes, 
implicitly vilifying the Chinese in the process.  In a private ceremony, Tenet called the 
men “True legends,” and presented them with the Director’s Medal for their 
“heroism…during those dark days of captivity.”196  The medal of recognition was 
certainly not an apology to the two Americans for being sacrificed for twenty years for 
the sake of Cold War politics.  Nor did the ceremony acknowledge the integral role of the 
195 Richard L. Madden, “Ex-Prisoner to See China, by Invitation,” New York Times, 28 
August 1983, 41; Downey quoted in Associated Press, “Ex-C.I.A. Man Accuses Dulles,” 
New York Times, 6 September 1983, 11.
196 Associated Press, “With Curious Timing, CIA Honors Spies Who Survived Chinese 
Prisons; ‘True Legends’ Actually Won Their Freedom in the ‘70s After Nixon’s Visit,” 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 5 July 1998, B6
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Chinese, specifically Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, in the eventual releases of Downey 
and Fecteau.  In fact, Tenet mocked the Chinese legal system and referred to the PRC 
pejoratively as “Red China.”  Similarly, in response to the award one congressman 
arrogantly noted it was “This Nation [the United States]” that “ultimately did not fail 
[Downey and Fecteau]” and it was “we [again the U.S.],” that “finally obtained the 
release of Dick Fecteau….[and] Jack Downey.”197
Further, in his speech Tenet distorted the truth surrounding the case, recreating 
events so as to get around Washington’s guilt in the affair.  He insisted that Mary 
Downey’s health was “the basis for [John’s] eventual release,” (a fabrication that 
Kissinger had debunked sixteen years earlier in his memoirs), and implied – with the 
word “ambush” – that the Chinese alone were responsible for Downey and Fecteau’s 
doomed mission.198  United States officials, in bestowing this honor unto Downey and 
Fecteau thus proved to have successfully sidestepped one of the persistently unresolved 
issues of the case.  While American officials had by now unequivocally conceded that 
Downey and Fecteau were CIA agents,199 there still had been no admission of 
Washington’s well-organized, twenty-year cover-up of that fact and the disastrously 
197 Congressman Porter J. Goss, Congressional Record – House, June 19, 1998, Volume 
144, Part 9, 2d Session, 13021-13022.
198 Tenet summarized Downey and Fecteau’s mission: “to swoop down and snatch out 
our imperiled agent.  It is the story of an ambush – of a crash landing – and of capture.”  
“Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet on Presentation of the 
Director’s Medal to John T. ‘Jack’ Downey and Richard G. Fecteau,” in CIA Press 
Release, 25 June 1998, from the Central Intelligence Agency website, <www.cia.gov>, 
accessed 16 June 2004.
199 Years before the CIA ceremony, during the Senate Watergate hearings, CIA Director 
Richard Helms commented that it was “now public knowledge that Mr. Downey and Mr. 
Fecteau were working for the CIA.”  Helms testimony before Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 
p. 3277.
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prolonging effect it had on the two men’s imprisonments. Judging from the CIA 
ceremony, moreover, American officials were not moving toward that type of concession 
in the future.
II
As the events in recent years attest, the twenty-one year ordeal, though technically 
over, lingers on.  While President Nixon’s January 1973 press conference statement had 
resolved some of the case’s major issues – including the true nature of Downey and 
Fecteau’s employment – other questions of the case remained unanswered.  Why had 
Downey and Fecteau’s releases come two decades after their initial imprisonments?  Why 
had American government officials refused to admit for twenty years that Downey and 
Fecteau had been employees of the CIA when it was clear high-level officials knew they 
were?  And after such an admission had been made, why had American officials still 
refused to admit that Washington’s cover-up had most definitely prolonged the 
imprisonments of Downey and Fecteau?  Finally, why did American policy seem to take 
precedence over Downey and Fecteau’s individual freedoms?
Suggesting one answer to these questions in a letter to Henry Kissinger following 
Downey’s release, South Carolina resident Dorothy Moore commented that it was “just 
too bad” that Nixon and Kissinger had not occupied the White House twenty years 
earlier.  She believed that had history played out in that way, Downey and Fecteau would 
have never remained in Chinese prison so long.200  Her comment, surely representative of 
many Americans’ sense of gratitude toward the President and his administration, to some 
200 Dorothy Moore to Kissinger, 12 March 1973, POL 27-7 KORN-US, RG 59, North 
Korea Files 1970-1973, Box 2423.
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extent gives too much credit to Nixon and too sharply criticizes Eisenhower officials.  
Had Nixon been president and Kissinger National Security Advisor in 1954, the outcome 
of the Downey-Fecteau case would not necessarily have been different.  (After all, Nixon 
had been Vice President under Eisenhower).  The power of the Cold War on American 
officials was incredibly strong, and the continuation of Dulles’s policies by the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations is surely evidence of this.
This leads to another possible explanation of the prisoner affair.  The Cold War, 
specifically in its effects on Sino-American relations, appears to be the simplest way of 
comprehending Downey and Fecteau’s imprisonments.  Such an explanation, while not 
comforting, successfully explains the shift from hostile American protest of the Chinese 
charges in the 1950s to talk of Sino-American cooperation and full disclosure in the 
1970s.  Clearly, Washington officials’ knowledge of Downey and Fecteau’s involvement 
with the CIA did not increase drastically during those twenty years, nor did the guilt or 
innocence of the men themselves change.  Thus, one could look to outside influences –
the Cold War – to explain the shift in policy.
Again, however, blaming the Cold War does not provide a satisfying conclusion 
to the ordeal.  While there is no doubt that the Chinese capture and imprisonment of 
Downey and Fecteau, the American refusal to admit fault in the affair, and the eventual 
releases of the two men were all carried out by individuals with Cold War mentalities, 
one must find fault with these individuals, not the abstract ideas they espoused.  
Furthermore, the fact that opportunities to end the prisoner affair did emerge throughout 
the 1950s is further evidence that blaming the Cold War is not sufficient.  
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John Downey appeared to have the answer in 1983, following his return from 
China.  During his stay in China Downey had learned the entire story behind his capture 
and imprisonment, and he was shocked to discover that he “could have been free 16 years 
earlier,” referring to Zhou’s newsmen-prisoner exchange offer.  Downey understood 
Secretary of State Dulles’s role in rejecting that particular offer and realized that the 
Secretary’s zealous anticommunism and rigid moralism had clearly motivated his 
ineffective actions.  Frustrated, Downey regretted that he could not “confront” the late 
Secretary of State to discuss his and Fecteau’s unnecessary imprisonments.201  Downey’s 
analysis seems accurate; one must look to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to 
understand fully the complex and disappointing course of the prisoner affair.  It was 
Dulles who had immediately lashed out against the Chinese for the “trumped up” charges 
of espionage.  It was Dulles who had refused to distribute passports to the prisoners’ 
families in 1955, insisting that the Chinese were an irrational, evil people who could not 
be trusted.  It was Dulles who had refused Zhou’s offer to release the prisoners if the 
United States would send American newsmen to the PRC, by far the best opportunity to 
that point to secure the releases of Downey and Fecteau.  Finally, it was Dulles who set 
the precedent for American policy on the prisoner issue, making it risky for future 
Democratic presidents to change course.  It was Dulles, the man, who had done all these 
things.  
As Downey likely recognized, the Secretary’s extraordinary animosity toward the 
Chinese Communists and communism in general, combined with his tendency toward 
oversimplification and exaggeration, precluded him from cooperating with the Chinese.  
201 Associated Press, “Ex-C.I.A. Man Accuses Dulles,” New York Times, 6 September 
1983, 11.
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A moralist to the end, Dulles consistently saw the Downey-Fecteau case as a fight 
between good and evil, between right and wrong, and thus compromise was never a 
realistic possibility.  Further, Dulles’s strong allegiance to the conservative China Lobby 
and McCarthyites in Washington gave his moral revulsion to the Chinese a degree of 
political legitimacy.202  While these characteristics may have been common among 
American officials during the 1950s, as Secretary of State (and one with the unflinching 
trust of the president), Dulles’s personality had extraordinary influence on American 
policy and action.    
Thus it was the unlucky, but not coincidental, fate of John Downey and Richard 
Fecteau to be imprisoned for two decades after flying covertly over China at the height of 
the Cold War, with a stubborn, anticommunist, anti-Chinese figure serving as the 
American Secretary of State.  The event tells a great deal both about the lengths 
American officials were willing to go to maintain their military and political course in the 
Cold War, and the lengths they were willing to go to conceal that course of action from 
the public in order to preserve international and domestic strength and legitimacy.
202 Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. 
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